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ABSTRACT
This paper  analyses the discourse within  the UN Security  Council concerning  the 
Darfur  conflict,  using the securitisation  framework developed by  the Copenhagen 
School.  It  is a  first move to apply  Securitisation  analysis to UN level.  The paper  aims 
at  investigating  whether  a  more precise understanding of the handling of the Darfur 
conflict can  be developed with  the use of the securitisation framework. While, at  the 
same time,  discussing strengths and weaknesses of the securitisation  framework, in 
terms of applying  it  to UN level.  The paper  concludes that there was wide agreement 
on  the identification  of the Darfur  conflict  as a  threat,  but  there was however  strong 
disagreements on what  measures to adopt.  Furthermore we argue that  the UN 
bureaucracy  has played a  major  role in  the securitisation  of Darfur  and have 
constituted important  actors in  terms of identifying  the conflict  and recommending 
policy  on  measures to implement.  These conclusions leads us to two final 
recommendations for  analysing  securitisation  within  the UN: (1) A  stronger  focus on 
the actors, especially  through  constructivist theory  of bureaucratic autonomy  is 
necessary, as the bureaucracy  plays a  major  role on  this level; (2) An  analytical 
emphasis on  the division  between  identification  of threats and mobilisation of 
measures, being  aware that  this division  might only  occur in  language within  the 
same forum.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AMIS: African Union Mission In Sudan
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SLA: Sudanese Liberation Army
SLM: Sudanese Liberation Movement
SPLM/A: Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army
UN: United Nations
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INTRODUCTION
THE DARFUR CONFLICT
The conflict  in  Darfur  started escalating  in  2003.  Sudan  had at  that  time been  in  a 
civil  war  between  North  and South  dating  all the way  back  to 1955  with  intense 
violence since 1983  (Barltrop 2011: 4). The civil war  between  ‘55  and ‘72  and again 
from  ‘83  to ‘05-’07  is highly  complex  but  is by  many  considered a  struggle for 
resources1,  power, identity  and a  race between  the Government of Sudan in 
Khartoum  and the South, later  united under  the SPLM/A (Sudanese Peoples 
Liberation Movement/Army) and Darfur  split up in  several rebel movements (de 
Waal & Flint 2005: Ekengaard 2008; Barltrop 2011).
UN Secretary  General Ban  Ki-Moon, in  2007,  also underlined that  Darfur  is “...  a 
case study  in  complexity”  (Ki-Moon 2007).  One of the issues worth  noting  is the long 
standing  conflicts between the Government  in  Khartoum  and the tribes of Darfur 
and the South, which  are complex in  many  ways. One of the reasons,  often 
mentioned,  is concerning the Arab-Supremacy  of the North  (Totten et  al.  198). The 
National Islamic Front 2  followed in  the 80’s and 90’s a  path  of oppressive and 
discriminatory  policies towards the South and the people of Darfur  in particular, 
leading  to serious disenfranchisement  (Indyk  2009: 3; de Waal & Flint  2005: 22-45; 
Totten  et  al.  2009: 198-202).  The disenfranchisement was brought into the broad 
daylight  as “The Black Book: Imbalance of Power  and Wealth  in Sudan” 3 in  2000 
started to become prevalent  all  over the country. It increased an  already  existing 
polarisation  between  the Arab North  and the “Black-African”  south  (Totten  et al. 
2009: 201). Tensions were already  prominent  before The Black  Book  came out but  it 
served as one of the many factors that triggered the conflict.
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1 Sudan has rich natural  oil  deposits and minerals, primarily  in the southern and central 
part of  the country, with high export rates to especially  China (de Waal  & Flint 2005; 
Ekengaard 2008)
2 The NIF is an islamist political  organisation  in Sudanese politics, supporting an islamic 
state. The NIF took  over  power in  Khartoum in 1989. President  Omar  Al-Bashir  is head 
of the organisation’s political party, National Congress.
3  The Black  Book is a book  issued by  the rebel  group JEM (Justice and Equality 
Movement) delineating the facts of  disenfranchisement within the  areas of  medical  care, 
water and resources, schools etc. (Totten et al. 2009: 201)
In  2003  the conflict  escalated in  the Western  Darfur  region  of Sudan  when  SLA 
(Sudanese Liberation  Army) and JEM (Justice and Equality  Movement) attacked a 
government  airport. The Government  of Sudan (GoS) responded with a  series of 
attacks against the rebel  movements including air  bombings as well as militia  attacks 
from  the government  supported Janjaweed4.  Within  7  months UN estimated that  at 
least  500.000 needed humanitarian  assistance and shortly  after Jan  Egeland called it 
“one of the worst  humanitarian  crises in  the world”  (UN a, 2003). The crisis rapidly 
evolved to be a  case of extremes with  repeated attacks against  civilians by  Janjaweed 
as well as government forces countered by  the rebel groups.  The involvement  of the 
GoS in  the atrocities has been  subject to intensive critique while  the international 
community  have been  criticised for  not  stopping the violence through interventionist 
measures (Black  & Williams 2010; Mamdani 2009; Barltrop 2011; Totten  et al.  2009; 
Simon 2008; etc.).
There was much hope that  the Comprehensive Peace Agreement  (CPA) signed in 
May  2004  between  SPLM/A and the Government  of Sudan, which  included power 
sharing,  land sharing,  excuses etc. could serve as a  political  momentum  for  also 
finding solutions to the conflict in  Darfur (Ekengaard 2008: 12). That was not the 
case as Barltrop argues: “The agreement was singularly  uncomprehensive in  that  it 
excluded the conflict  in  Darfur  …” (2011: 183) and as a  consequence the conflict in 
Darfur kept on escalating.
Critics have argued that stronger  international peacekeeping  missions could have 
helped to monitor  the peace and enforce it when  not  kept  (Black & Williams 2010; 
Totten  et  al.  2009: 206-11; Barltrop 2011). The African  Union  Mission 5 “constituted 
little more than  a  paper  tiger” (Totten  et  al.  207)  and the international  society,  in 
general,  “has fallen  tragically  short  of meeting the protection needs of the people of 
Darfur.”  (Black  & Williams 2010: 260).  The possibility  of stronger mandated and 
larger  interventions was though  becoming more likely,  during the conflict, as the 
UN Security Council and Darfur
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4 Janjaweed is a  militia consisting of the Arab  minority  in  the Darfur  region. They  were 
aroused and equipped by  the Government of  the Sudan to “put down the rebellious 
African’s” as government  forces were active  in the conflict between North  and South. 
(Black & Williams 2010: 7).
5 The African Union Mission  (AMIS) was established in 2004 with  a force of  a little more 
than 150 men and extended in 2005 to include 7000 troops. It  responded rapidly  to the 
situation on the ground but  is by  many  considered as not having the strength  / size to 
carry out its mandate (Akuffo 2010; Williams 2006, 2009)
leaders of the world,  at  the 2005  World Summit,  agreed on  adopting some of the 
principles of Responsibility to Protect in the Outcome Document. 
The emerging  norm  of Responsibility  to Protect  has many  roots,  one can  be found in 
post  cold war  academic discussion.  Spurred by  events in  Somalia and Kuwait (and 
later  in  Yugoslavia and Rwanda),  discussions started to arise on  how  the “Other” 6 
was not always followed by  policies of deterrence and threats but  policies started 
centering  around protection  (Weber  1995).  Suddenly  “Security  policies benefited not 
only  the (selfish) ‘national’  interest’,  but  also the universal values and the peoples of 
other (less civilised and democratic) states”  (Buzan  & Wæver  2009: 219).  This idea 
was also included in  the 1994  report  of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) linking the security  of the State to that of its people (Simon 2008: 46).  That 
challenged the perception  of Sovereignty  and suddenly  implied that  state sovereignty 
also entailed responsibilities. The Secretary  General of the UN Kofi Annan was one of 
the big  advocates for  especially  this understanding  of Sovereignty  and throughout  the 
late 90’s he urged the International community  to unite and come up with  a  set of 
principles for what sovereignty entails. He said in 2000:
“… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable  assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity?”
(Evans et al. 2001: VII)
That  call was answered by  the Canadian  Government who in  September  2000 at a 
General Assembly  meeting announced the establishment  of the International 
Commission on Intervention on  State Sovereignty.  The commission  produced the 
report  “The Responsibility  to Protect“  following  consultation  with  governments, 
NGO’s etc,  all around the world, arguing that Sovereignty  should be viewed upon  as a 
responsibility. Simon (2008: 47) sums it up like this:
“… the  concept acknowledges that the  primary responsibility of protecting 
the  people  within a state  is  that of the  sovereign state  where the  people 
belong. The  core  of the  concept is that where  the  state is unable  or unwilling 
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6 The “Other” is here  understood as the construction  of  “states, groups and other  non-
Selves” (Campbell  1992) in order  to oppose and create  the  identity  of  the constructing 
state. During the Cold War, it  could be  argued, the US constructed the communist  Russia 
as the Other opposed to which it could build its own identity and foreign policy.
to protect its people, or is itself the source  of threats, the  responsibility shifts 
to the international community.“
That  responsibility  was agreed upon in  2005  at  the World Summit  where the leaders 
of the world wrote Responsibility  to Protect into the outcome document. Later  in 
2006 it was adopted as a resolution making the norm formally part of the UN.
PROBLEM AREA
The fact  that  the UN Security  Council  have repeatedly  been  criticised for  lack of 
action and political will,  while at  the  same time adopting  the Responsibility  to 
Protect seems paradoxical. The Responsibility  to Protect norm  is more than anything 
a  call for  action, both  preventive but  also peace enforcing,  and what  seems 
characteristic  about the UN’s handling  of the conflict is a  lack of precisely  that.  The 
fact  that  UN was aware that  the AU’s response,  with  AMIS, was not able to carry  out 
its mandate and protect  the people of Darfur  (Williams 2006,  168)  calls for  an 
understanding  of the UN’s handling  of the conflict. Especially  as the norm  of 
Responsibility to Protect was adopted at the same time.
Badescu  & Bergholm  argue that  “... Darfur  in line with the R2P framework shows a 
number  of key  challenges to implementation …”  (2009: 306)  and Alex  de Waal 
writes about  “Darfur  and failure of Responsibility  to Protect” (de Waal 2007).  These 
investigations echo a  large amount  of academic work  done on  trying  to understand 
the case of Darfur  and the challenges it  has constituted for  understanding both 
regional  and global conflict resolution. This involves both  realist approaches,  focused 
on  material and objective interests of the actors, as well  as constructivists concerned 
with  the role of international organisations along  with  a  wide range of other  different 
approaches7. 
Complementary  to these, the securitisation  framework founded by  the Copenhagen 
School (CS) is:
UN Security Council and Darfur
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7 This include work on  historical  approaches (Daly  2007; Flint & de Waal  2008), policy 
analysis (Funk  & Fake 2009; Mamdani  2009), humanitarian intervention and African 
Politics (Bellamy  2006; Willett 2005; Williams 2006; Williams 2007), the question of 
genocide and its political  implications (Straus 2005; Brunk  2008; Totten et  al. 2009). A 
more precise explanation of the work done Darfur can be found in Kírály, 2010.   
“Based on a clear idea of the  nature of security, [and] aims to gain an 
increasingly precise  understanding of who securitizes, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, 
under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful).”  
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1997: 32)
This approach  offers possibilities of new  insights into the handling  of the Darfur 
conflict, due to its epistemological focus on discourse. However, the securitisation 
theory  have not  yet been  used to analyse security  issues within  the UN Security 
Council. This constitutes some challenges for  the empirical use of the framework, 
especially  regarding conceptual and methodological definitions. Testing  the 
securitisation framework on  the global level  is though  increasingly  important  as 
security  issues are becoming  more and more globalised creating  “...  a  domestic 
political cost  for  inaction and indifference”  (Evans et  al. 2001: 7). Darfur  could be 
considered a  pivotal case as it  is one of the first conflicts,  after  the  UN failure in 
Rwanda,  where the UN Security  Council had the opportunity  to demonstrate will and 
act  on it.  Darfur is also considered a  pivotal case at  other  levels where investigations 
have sought to explain  paradoxes and irregularities.   Kírály  have i.e. investigated 
securitisations within  the US Congress trying  to understand the discrepancy  between 
rhetorics and action “despite the  fact that the meaning of Darfur was 
intersubjectively established between securitising actor and audience”  (Kírály 
2010: 8).  With  the help of the securitisation  framework  an investigation  at  UN level 
can  both  challenge the framework  itself and provide a  constructivist  account for  the 
paradox  between  the adoption  of Responsibility  to Protect and the criticism  of UN 
action. Thus providing important insights to the UN Security  Council’s handling  of 
Darfur.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
How  can  the securitisation  framework help to develop a  more precise understanding 
of the UN Security Council’s handling of the Darfur conflict?
PRELIMINARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1.How  is the securitisation framework positioned within  the field of 
International Security Studies?
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2.How  has the rhetorics of Responsibility  to Protect  been  prominent  in  the 
securitisation of Darfur?
3.Who have been  the important  actors in  securitising  the Darfur  conflict 
within UN Security Council?
4.To what  extent  is it  the same actors as the ones contributing to the 
discourse that influence decisions on how and what to implement?
5.Has the Responsibility  to Protect  norm  been institutionalised within  the 
UN Security Council
AIM AND METHOD
The aim  of this paper is to investigate how  a  securitisation analysis can  provide a 
more precise account of the UN Security  Council’s handling  of the Darfur  conflict. 
This serves two main  purposes: First,  to provide a  comprehensive and concise 
understanding  of the handling of the Darfur conflict  from  a  CS perspective  relying  on 
discourse analysis. Second,  the investigation serves as a  first  move to apply 
securitisation analysis to the global level,  and thus it  provides insights into how  or 
whether the framework works at UN level. 
The paper is based on first and secondary  sources.  Information on  the conflict  in 
Darfur  is based on  secondary  sources,  including reports,  academic  research  etc.  The 
analysis is based on first  hand sources,  consisting  of all  meeting summaries, 
resolutions and joint  statements from  the UN Security  Council from  2003-2008 
related to the conflict.  Furthermore,  for  accounts on  the Responsibility  to Protect we 
have used both  secondary  and primary  sources, including  official reports and summit 
outcome documents.
Important  readings on  Securitisation  analysis, of course, includes the original 
writings,  e.g.  Ole Wæver’s “Concepts of Security”  (1995),  Wæver,  Buzan  & de Wilde’s 
“Security  - A  New  Framework  for  Analysis”  (1998),  Buzan & Wæver’s “Regions and 
Powers”  (2003). In  “The Evolution  of International Security  Studies”  (2009),  Buzan 
and Hansen offers a  concise account of Securitisation theory  seen in  relation  to other 
ISS scholars. As the framework is widely  discussed it  is rerecommendable to look 
into articles from  peer  reviewed magazines such  as “Security  Dialogue”, 
“Alternatives: Global, Local, Political”, “Security  Studies”  and “European  Journal of 
International Relations”. 
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SCOPE OF THE PAPER
This paper  is constructed around three main  parts.  The first  introduces the 
securitisation framework,  in  relation to International Security  Studies,  and outlines 
the conceptual definitions of the framework.  This part  serves two purposes: it 
describes the theoretical foundation  of the framework  and how  it  aims at  describing 
real world phenomena. Secondly, this part  serves as a  delineation of the conceptual 
definitions and theoretical foundation of our analysis. 
The second part  of the paper is a  presentation  of an  inductive discourse analysis of 
the UN Security  Council’s handling  of the Darfur  conflict. It  is divided 
chronologically  into years,  wherein an  overall discourse on security  is presented. 
Each year is followed by a securitisation analysis of the discourse(s).
The third part discusses how  the findings from  the analysis can contribute to a more 
precise understanding  of the Security  Council’s handling  of the conflict. This 
discussion draws on  contemporary  critique of the securitisation  framework, and uses 
this to elaborate on  the findings.  Furthermore this last  part reflects on  how  the 
theoretical framework of securitisation works at UN level.
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SECURITISATION THEORY
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
International Security  Studies (ISS)  broke out  from  the former disciplines of War 
Studies and Military  History  Studies in  the 1950’s (Buzan  & Hansen  2009: 8) as 
Wolfers started discussing  the concept  of Security  and especially  the epistemological 
conceptions: objective and subjective security  (Wolfers 1952: 485). Much  attention 
has since been  given  to the field of Security  - that,  despite much disagreement on 
what  is compromised by  ISS (Baldwin  1997).  The mainstream  research  mostly 
focused on policy  interests with  strong  emphasis on  the state and military  capacities 
(Buzan  1983: 3). There was however  contesting views on  whether  Security  Studies 
either  paralleled, complemented or  opposed general IR-theory  (Buzan & Hansen 
2009: 14).  Buzan  and Hansen  (2009: 10)  argues: “Security  is about constituting 
something  that  needs to be secured …”  (Buzan & Hansen  2009: 11) letting  the 
common interest in the Referent  Object  bring  their  writings together  under  the label 
of ISS. 
The Referent  Object  has traditionally  been  the state,  as it  was “... seen  instrumentally 
as the best  way  of protecting  other  referent  objects”  (Ibid. 11). That  should be 
understood in  relation  to the Treaty  of Westphalia,  that  safeguarded the exclusive 
sovereignty  of the state,  as well as the Cold War  bipolar  situation - both leading  to a 
state-centered focus on  referent  objects only  concerned with  external threats to these 
(Simon,  2008: 48; Potter  2006: 27). In the late 1980’s and especially  after  the end of 
the Cold War the epistemological conceptions of objective and subjective8 security 
were challenged by  the discursive approach  claiming  that  neither  a  subjective nor 
objective understanding  of Security  could explain why  some cases are securitised and 
some are not  (McDonald 2008: 564). Security  in  that understanding  is not objective 
but a  self-referential practice (Buzan,  Wæver, De Wilde,  1998: 24). The Copenhagen 
School is one of the important contributors to this discussion (Williams 2003: 512).
UN Security Council and Darfur
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8 Objective Security  can be explained as the absence/presence  of concrete  threats. Such 
threats are defined in relative material  terms - being objective.Subjective  Security  is on 
the other  hand the subjective feeling of  being threatened or  not. Being subjective it 
emphasizes historical, social  and psychological  sense of  fear but relates to the objective 
threats as mentioned. (Buzan & Hansen 2009: 34; Wolfers 1952: 485)
The Copenhagen School developed the securitisation  framework, which  aim  is to 
provide a  concise understanding  of how  certain issues become security  issues thus 
allowing  for  handling  the issues out  of the normal  constraints of politics.  This 
understanding  is based on  the construction of an  intersubjective understanding of 
something  as an existential threat  to a  certain  referent  object,  thereby  legitimising 
extraordinary  measures.  Thus,  the aim  is not  to discuss what  normatively  should 
constitute security  issues,  but  rather  to gather  knowledge on  when  and how  issues 
become security  issues and under  what circumstances (Buzan,  Wæver  & de Wilde 
1998: 32).  It  uses an  elaborate series of concepts,  such  as “security”,  “normal 
politics”,  “emergency  measures”,  “audience”  etc.  These concepts require discussion 
and consideration as they  are not  unambiguously  defined within  the original 
framework.
WIDENING OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT
The basic  conceptual discussion  within  securitisation is concerning  with  how  to 
define security,  how  this concept  is understood and how  it  can be analysed9.  CS’s 
definition  of security,  on  one side widens but also narrows the concept. The idea  of 
security  as a  speech  act  is central. In  Wæver’s own words,  this can  be summarised as 
such:
“What then is security? With the  help of language  theory, we  can regard 
“security”  as a speech act. In this  usage, security is not of interest as a sign 
that refers  to something more  real; the  utterance itself is  the act. By saying it, 
something is done.” 
(Wæver 1995: 55)
Thus, Wæver  widens the use of security  as more than  the military  sense of the 
concept  - if the speech  act  allows for  it.  The CS thus argues for  a  wider  definition  of 
security  that  can encompass more than the traditional  idea  of military  security. 
Because of the fact  that  economic, cultural  and environmental  issues are spoken  of as 
security  issues they  should be incorporated into the framework  (Wæver,  1995).  Thus, 
a  case of securitisation  is not  anymore a  matter  of survival in  the original sense,  but 
can  also be described as securitising cases with  threats against a  wider  range of 
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9  This is a conceptual  definition brought  up  in almost any  theoretical  work  on 
securitisation  - see Buzan, Wæver  and de  Wilde 1998; Wæver 1995; Buzan and Wæver 
2003
referent  objects. The CS widens the concept of security  into sectors  of security: 
Military, Political,  Economic,  Societal  and Environmental. Buzan,  Wæver  and de 
Wilde (1998: 7) defines the sectors “as identifying specific  types of interaction.”. For 
the CS the main argument is hereby  a  matter  of strongly  defining, in  very  specific 
terms, what  security  is,  wherein it  is more “than  just  any  threat  or  problem”  (ibid: 5). 
This is obtained by  defining security  issues as containing  existential  threats and thus 
legitimise extraordinary  measures (measures that are  outside of the normal political 
procedures) (ibid.). In this sense it  is not up to the analyst to define what  security  is - 
it  is defined by  a  speech act  that is accepted by  an  audience.  That  approach  removes 
the idea  of objective and subjective security,  making  it a  matter  of intersubjective 
understandings.  In that  sense they  widen the concept  making  security  a  matter  of 
speech  acts and narrow  it  by  demanding  an  intersubjective understanding of what 
constitutes security issues.
Conclusively, the CS’s conception  of security  implies a  different  analytical focus,  than 
more traditional approaches to ISS. Rather  than  investigating  objective and material 
interests,  the conception  of security  as a speech  act forces the analyst  to focus on 
rhetorics, language and discourse of security.
SECTORS IN SECURITY ANALYSIS
As mentioned above the widening  of the security  concept provides a  different 
analytical  focus,  allowing for  a  wider  range of issues becoming  “security”.  The 
traditional approach,  focusing  on the military  sector  in  security  studies,  is focused on 
state-state relation and as Buzan and Hansen (2009: 21) puts it:
“This  concept of security defines  the  state  as the  referent object, the  politics of 
security as engagement with radical dangers  and the  adoption of emergency 
measures, and it studies security through positivist, rationalist 
epistemologies. “
Buzan  and Hansen argue that  one of the most  important reasons for  this state focus 
is the transformation  of the state from  the medieval to the modern  state system  in 
which  boundaries between  sovereign  states becomes the  “significant dividing 
line”  (2009: 23). Furthermore, as Hobbes argued,  the state was the primary  provider 
of individual security why it received analytical focus (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 24).
UN Security Council and Darfur
14 of 59
Buzan  and Hansen  (2009: 25) outlines two main  arguments against  this focus. 
Firstly, the argument  that  some states are too weak or  unable to provide security  for 
their  people,  and secondly,  that  some states are working  in  opposition  of what  their 
people might want,  exemplified by  autocratic  regimes with  the sole  purpose of 
keeping  incumbents in  power. This debate spurred the development of new  sectors of 
security and opened the discussion of widening the security concept. 
The CS strongly  emphasises the use of a  sectoral approach, and it  is defined as a  key 
element in  security  analysis and thoroughly  developed in  the work of the school 
(Wæver  1995; Buzan, Wæver  and de Wilde 1998). Wæver’s (1995: 219-220) basic 
argument for the use of security  in  other  sectors, than the military, is that it  is natural 
that  what can  happen  in the military  sector can also take place in  other  sectors.  In 
other words, irreversible defeat  from  a  threat  in  any  given sector will create the same, 
somewhat  metaphorical,  outcome: Defeat and in  this sense an  abolishment  of what 
was there - what  was threatened. When we say  we are threatened - in  the sense that if 
nothing is done, what is threatened will cease to exist, we are speaking security.
This basic notion  that  threats can  exist within  any  given  sector  allows for  analysts to 
embark on  investigations dealing  with  threats against something as immaterial  as 
norms, values and ideas which  cannot be covered by  objective, materially  focused 
methods. Thus,  if the framework did not  recognise different sectors we would not be 
able to analyse threats against  norms such  as Human  Rights, in  our  case in  the 
Darfur  conflict.  We will  not go into depth  with  the different sectors, but  it  is 
important to stress the basic assumption  that  norms and values can  constitute 
referent objects, as that is part of our analysis.
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK
“Based on a clear idea of the  nature  of security, securitization studies  aims to 
gain an increasingly precise  understanding of who securitizes, on what 
issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, and with what results, 
and, not least, under what conditions ...” 
(Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998: 32). 
Most  important  are the two conceptual actors: the securitizing  actor  and the 
audience - a  securitising  actor  performs a speech act  in  which  he tries to convince the 
audience about the necessity  to allow  a  certain existential  threat, to a  certain referent 
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object, to be handled with  means outside normal  politics thereby  taking special 
measures (Buzan  & Hansen,  2009: 214).  That  action  consists of many  concepts,  and 
demands that many  definitions are made. In  the following  chapter  we will shortly 
outline these and the understandings we ascribe to them, as they  are much  debated 
and has been developed much since they were first outlined in ‘98. 
We will go through  the Securitising Actor (and the Facilitating Conditions and the 
Functional Actors),  the Audience and the  Referent Object finishing  with  a short 
discussion of these relating  to our  use of the concepts.  The discussion and 
understanding  of the Speech Act, Special Measures,  Existential Threats  and Normal 
Politics will be presented in the analysis. 
The Securitising Actor is explained by  Buzan, Wæver  & de Wilde as “actors who 
securitize issues by  declaring something  - a  referent  object  - existentially 
threatened”  (1998: 38).  The Securitising Actor is most commonly  identified among 
political leaders, bureaucracies, Governments, Lobbyists and Pressure groups even 
though  this identification  is very  difficult. As the CS argue it  can  be extremely 
difficult as “...  one can  disaggregate any  collective into subunits and on  down to 
individuals …”  (Ibid: 40).  They  solve this problem  through  methodological 
collectivism  focusing  on  the Social Whole  as the subject  of research  to understand 
the individual rather  than  the other  way  around (Ibid: 41; Andersen  & Kaspersen 
2007: 61). They  do that by  focusing  on  “...  the organizational  logic of the speech act 
[as it]  is probably  the best way  to identify  who or  what is the securitizing 
actor”  (Buzan,  Wæver  & De Wilde 1998: 41). Furthermore the Securitising Actor is 
given  by  its Social  Capital,  letting the analyst focus on  the actor’s social  power  in 
relation to the facilitating conditions. This could lead one to think that the CS is 
suddenly  focusing  on  the actor  before the speech  act, but they  do not  as they  regard 
the Social  Capital  of the actor  as being manifested in  the speech  act,  using  Judith 
Butler’s theories on “social  magic”. This will be elaborated in the Methodological 
Considerations. 
The facilitating conditions  are considered the political and societal conditions under 
which  the speech  act works (Ibid: 32). The Functional Actors  significantly  influence 
all  decisions in the field of security  within  the dynamics of a  sector  and thereby  either 
complement  or  oppose a  securitisation, without being  the referent  object  (Ibid: 39). 
Both concepts will be elaborated through the analysis.
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The Audience is given  by  the CS’s understanding  of security  as an  intersubjective and 
socially  constructed concept.  The actor  has a  subjective perception of some threat 
and unless the Audience accepts this threat and thereby  establishes an 
intersubjective understanding  of the threat,  the threat  is not  a  security  issue (Ibid: 
31).  The Audience  is in  that sense extremely  important  for  establishing something  as 
security and thereby given by whoever the actor addresses. 
The Referent Object is in  its character  hard to define as it  is very  sector-dependant 
and often  constrained by  the facilitating conditions.  Today, however,  the spectrum  of 
referent  objects has been  widened excessively  and changes with  time (Buzan,  Wæver, 
De Wilde 1998: 36). The most  recent  effort  to widen  the concept  beyond the work of 
the CS have been  to look at  the “human”  as a  referent  object (Watson  2011). Watson 
argues that  the the framework of securitisation  is the best  way  to approach the 
subject  of humanitarianism  within  ISS because it  can  unveil  some of the ambiguity 
surrounding  the understanding  of humanitarianism  (Watson  2011: 5). Watson  here 
relates to Roe,  arguing  that  different  agreements might be possible at  different  levels, 
especially  concerning  what measures are taken - and securitisation  theory  can  unveil 
these differences (Roe 2008: 632).
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES: RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT
Buzan, Wæver  & de Wilde did not  give much attention  to the system  level in  their 
original  writings as the theoretical framework “...  is generally  easier  at  the middle-
level and more difficult  at  the individual (...)  and the system  level …” (Buzan  & 
Wæver  2009: 254). Many  scholars,  themselves amongst, have though  begun to use 
the framework on  new  grounds arguing  that  the international circumstances could be 
changing  (Buzan  & Wæver  2009: 256; Watson 2011: 6; Totten et  al.  2009: 306).  As 
they  said in ‘98,  the system  level  could indeed “...  become more attractive in  the 
future as international circumstances change.” (1998: 36). 
One could argue that international circumstances are indeed changing  in  many  ways, 
most notably  because of globalisation, i.e.  of communication, suddenly  making a 
genocide in Africa  a  global matter  affecting  the international political  environment 
(Totten  et  al. 2009: 306; Eriksson  2011: 6; Power  2002).  It  is also notable that 
further  changes such as a  radical  shift from  inter-state to intra-state conflicts,  the 
SIB 21.2 Group 9A, 2nd semester spring 2012
17 of 59
peaceful ending  of the Cold War etc.  were  difficult  to explain  through  traditional 
security  studies (Buzan  & Hansen  2009: 187). The Responsibility  to Protect  norm 
manifest  this,  at  least rhetorically, change in  the new  approach towards sovereignty  - 
understanding  sovereignty  as a  responsibility  rather  than  a  right  (Evans et al.  2001). 
It is difficult  to put  a  date to the start  of this debate, some researchers emphasising 
on  the international criminal tribunals of the 90’s (Totten  et  al. 2009: 292) and 
others on the advocacy  role played out  by  Secretary  General Kofi Annan  in  the late 
90’s and early  2000’s (Simon  2008).  Whatever  the origin it  is clear  that  the norm  of 
Responsibility  to Protect faces many  challenges in  implementation.  The report 
“Responsibility  to Protect”  by  the International Commission  on Intervention  and 
State Sovereignty  came out in  2001  and received much  attention  from  the 
international community  (Watson 2011: 4). In  2005  it was discussed at the World 
Summit and became part of the outcome document  in  which  the leaders of the world 
declared:
“Clear and Unambiguous acceptance  by all governments of the  collective 
international Responsibility to protect populations  from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Willingness to take 
timely and decisive collective  action for this purpose, through the  Security 
Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to do so.” 
(UN 2005: 1)
In  2006  it  was adopted in  resolution  1674  by  the Security  Council.  It was described 
as “a  Landmark resolution”  (Oxfam  2006) when they  in  paragraph  4  of the 
resolution  wrote that they  “reaffirms  the provisions of paragraph 138  and 139  of the 
2005  World Summit  Outcome Document”  (UNSC 2006a)  making the norm  part  of 
UN regulations and thereby  adopting these  political norms into the institutional 
framework. 
With  the adoption  of the Responsibility  to Protect  norm  in  resolution  1674  the 
conditions for  military  interventions changed significantly,  in  cases of human rights 
violations and humanitarian  law.  The development and institutionalisation  of 
paragraph  138 & 139  of the 2005  World Summit  Outcome Document  changes the 
focus from  the imprecise qualifications for  interventions given  above to the less 
imprecise qualifications of “genocide, war  crimes, ethnic cleansing  and crimes 
against humanity”  (UN 2005) given  by  the Rome Statute.  But as the Rome Statute is 
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not signed by  members such as China, US, Israel etc.,  it  can  not  really  be defined as 
having  complete legitimacy  being  precise (Bellamy  et  al. 2011: 69).  On  that 
grounding  it  should,  no longer  be a question  of whether something  should be done - 
if crimes against  humanity,  human  rights violations or  war  crimes are occurring and 
the domestic government manifestly  fails to address the issues,  then  action  must  be 
taken. But as well  as the Rome Statute does not receive cohesive support, the 
resolutions calling  on  R2P or  the Rome Statute can,  can  as well, be both  weak and 
strong. Resolution  1674  has thus been  subject  for much  debate and has been highly 
controversial with  a  majority  of countries accepting  and promoting  the norm 
opposed by  a  rather  large fraction 10 of countries opposing  it  because of a  fear that the 
norm  would allow  for  “abuse of the concept  to justify  illegal interventions in 
states”  (Bellamy  et  al. 2011: 70).  Conclusively  we can say  that  R2P norm  offers some 
arguments for  intervening  in countries for  the sake of the people - the norm  is, 
however, very fragile as many countries still oppose it.
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10 Consisting among others of: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan and Venezuela 
(Bellamy et al. 2011: 70)
THE CRISIS IN DARFUR - SECURITISATION WITHIN THE 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The constructivist  epistemology  of Securitisation  has roots in  both philosophical and 
sociological theories (Buzan  & Hansen 2009: 213-17).  Shortly  we will  try  to identify 
some of these roots and explain  their  importance for  this paper. The constructivist 
idea  that  phenomena  such  as anarchy, which  Realist  scholars consider  as existing 
objectively,  was formally  challenged by  Alexander  Wendt  (1992)  when  he wrote the 
paper “Anarchy  is what States make of it: the social construction  of Power  Politics” 
arguing that the international anarchical society of states is a social construction. 
One of the most  radical  critics to the idea  that  universal or  objective  truths exist  is 
Michel Foucault who claims that  there is no understanding  other  than  history  and 
society  why  an  investigation  will have to focus on  discourse to understand society 
and relations of power instead of power  itself (Foucault  1984: 64). The 
understanding  of Wendt  is thus to a  high  degree accepted in  the Securitisation 
framework as well as it  follows Foucault’s analytical focus on  discourse,  as the form 
of knowledge that  circulates,  and promotes certain  ideas.  Foucault  does this by 
analysing  chains of statements, practices (institutionalised statement processes) and 
the historically  and culturally  determined rules that regulate the form  and content of 
the order of talk (Foucault 1984: 60). 
The CS takes a  slightly  different approach  than  Foucault  on  this issue and focuses 
more on  the impact  of language in concrete situations,  understanding a  speech  act  as 
holding  the “social  magic”  of an  actor  in the organisational logic  of the speech  itself 
(Buzan,  Wæver  & de Wilde 1998: 46).  However,  their  nomad approach  to science 
(changing  topics and empirical  fields,  being  interdisciplinary  etc.) relates very  much 
to Foucault’s. With  Wendt  they  share a  post-positivist epistemology  looking  for  the 
outcomes of social action  through  qualitative investigations, without  denying the 
possibility  of material interests nor  the presence of socially  constructed ideas and 
paradigms.
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Post-positivist  (critical constructivists) scholars are sometimes considered normative 
as they  incorporate ethical  considerations in their  theory  (Buzan,  Wæver & de Wilde 
1998: 34). The CS,  as opposed to the critical constructivists, “abstain from  attempts 
to talk  about what  “real security”  would be  for  people [and]  what  are “actual”  security 
problems larger  than those propagated by  elites …”  (Buzan, Wæver  & de Wilde: 1998: 
34-35). Instead they  pursue to understand the “modus operandi”  (Ibid. 35)  of the 
actors assuming  that  the, even  socially  constructed,  structure of security  actions are 
often  sedimented and relatively  stable. Thereby,  once again, abstaining from  taking 
normative choices of what  should constitute security  (Ibid.  35). This disagreement 
with  the critical constructivists is important  for  the analyst  to note as it  demands of 
him  or  her  to not make distinctions of what should be securitised and what should 
not. The task of the analyst is thus to identify  not  more or  less security, but 
securitisation or  not securitisation. Doing  this, according to Buzan, Wæver  & de 
Wilde,  the approach  takes away  some of the normativity  of the analyst  and lets him 
“understand the mechanisms of securitisation  while keeping  a  distance from 
security”  (1998: 35). In our  analysis we have tried to work according to this ideal but 
also recognising  that  we are biased by  some normative ideas about  how  to handle the 
conflict in  the best way. We have tried to minimise this by  reading  an  extensive 
amount  of literature on conflict resolution  and letting this literature decide what 
measures are appropriate when  addressing  the conflict. This is not a  perfect solution, 
especially  when  trying  to identify  what constitutes extraordinary  measures,  as that 
concept  is not  clearly  defined and contextual in  nature.  For that  reason we try, 
throughout the analysis,  to be very  explicit  about why  we regard measures as 
extraordinary or not.
On domestic  level securitisation  analyses have been  conducted within  the recent 
years (Roe 2008; Mcdonald 2008; etc). Kírály  being  the only  one trying,  on  the 
middle-level,  to get  an  understanding  of the lack of special measures “despite the fact 
that  the meaning  of Darfur  was intersubjectively  established between  securitising 
actor  and audience”  (Kírály  2010: 8). Kírály  (2010)  focused especially  on  the US, 
where various NGO’s and pressure groups demonstrated and called for  action  from 
the politicians. The campaign  received much  attention and according to Black  & 
Williams (2010: 160)  provided a  cost  for  political inaction.  According to Kírály 
(2010: 44)  the securitising  actors (NGO’s,  Save Darfur  Coalition)  succeeded in 
securitising  Darfur  but without  agreeing  on  special measures. Kírály  further  argues, 
in  line with  Roe (2008: 633),  that  this discrepancy  can be understood if applying 
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political theory  and realist  notions of realpolitik  to the stage of Mobilisation  (active 
securitization). The critique from  Roe and Kírály, we believe,  could help 
conceptualise possible  discrepancies between  rhetorics and action.  We will  therefore 
be aware of a  possible divide in  “modus operandi”  between  identification and 
mobilisation throughout the analysis. 
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ANALYSIS
Through  this chapter  we will  present  the findings of our  analysis on the Darfur 
conflict in  the UN Security  Council.  The findings are presented in  chronological 
order  going  through each  year. Each  year  consists of a  presentation  of important 
historical events and of the discursive developments from  UN officials and state 
representatives. This analysis of discourse will be focused on  the use of security 
language during  the meetings concerning  the conflict in  Darfur.  After  the 
presentation  of the discursive elements, we present  the  results of our securitisation 
analysis of the same period. In  this,  we will  go through  some of the most significant 
securitising  moves made in  speeches, defining  the audience of the acts, the referent 
objects and finally an evaluation of whether the securitising moves were successful. 
The analysis is based on  all official meeting summaries,  resolutions and reports from 
the Secretary  General to the Security  Council  (UN Security  Council),  during  the 
period of 2003-2008. The total  number  of meetings during  the period is 104, 
whereas 16  of them  were closed and no summaries were available.  The remaining  88 
is consisting  of summaries from  open  meetings, some of these (around 15%) only 
including official statements done on  behalf of the Security  Council - thus there has 
been  no formal  debate at these meetings. The body  of the analysis is thus consisting 
of speeches by  national representatives to the Security  Council and speeches by  UN 
officials appointed to the case. Furthermore we make use of resolutions adopted 
within  the Security  Council,  enabling  us to analyse the intersubjective 
understandings and agreements on measures to implement.
The analysis is thus based both  on  an  extensive analysis of the debates,  consisting of 
speeches and reports,  which  constitutes the backbone of the analysis and analyses of 
the resolutions adopted by  the Security  Council. The debates within  the Security 
Council constitutes the rather narrow  scope of our  discourse  analysis.  Narrowing the 
scope is necessary  for  providing  knowledge on how  this specific  political 
environment  has dealt with  the conflict  in Darfur. Through  that analysis we will be 
able to identify  (dis)agreements on  defining  the referent objects, audiences and what 
securitising  moves are being acted. However  we will  try  to make this analysis 
contextual  as the conflict  of Darfur  is, as Ban Ki-moon  states,  “...  a case study  in 
complexity”  (Ki-Moon  2007). Jan Pronk and many  others time and time again 
emphasises how  “peace in  the Sudan is indivisible” (S/PV.5119) arguing  that the 
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conflict between  SPLM/A  and the GoS as opposed to the conflict  in  Darfur  can  not  be 
solved apart  from  each  other. For  that reason  we have pursued a  contextual analysis 
trying to take the situation  of both  conflicts into consideration making a  short 
paragraph  within  each given time period with  the most important political 
developments of both conflicts (also outside the Security Council).
2003 AND 2004: IDENTIFYING DARFUR AS A SECURITY THREAT 
In March  2003  the conflict  in  Darfur  started escalating  as members of the SPLA 
(Sudanese Liberation  Army) attacked the Government Airport  of El Fasher  (Barltrop 
2011: 32). The ongoing  conflict  between  the GoS (Government  of Sudan)  and SLA 
and JEM (Justice and Equality  Movement)  in  south Sudan,  as had happened before, 
spread to the diverse and complex  area of Darfur   and became increasingly  violent 
with  immense violations of human  rights (Barltrop 2011: 25; Mamdani 2009: 199). 
In  April 2004  the African Union  responded to the crisis with interventionist 
measures establishing  the monitoring  AMIS (African  Union  Mission  in  the Sudan) to 
make sure that the peace agreements already  agreed upon 11, such  as the cease-fire 
between  the GoS and the SPLM/A  (Sudanese Peoples Liberation  Movement/Army), 
was kept.  In  October  the same year  AMIS was expanded with  more troops to address 
the constant violations of the cease-fire (Kreps 2010: 68).  The efforts of AU was 
consistently  backed up by  the Security  Council  which  in  Resolution  1564  gave credit 
to AMIS and issues possible sanctions if the GoS does not  accept the extension of 
AMIS (Kreps 2010: 68; Ekengaard 2008: 19).  In  2004  the UN’s first  response to the 
conflict between  SPLM/A  and the GoS was taken with  the deployment of the small 
UNAMIS (United Nations Advance Mission  In  Sudan)  that were to explore the 
challenges of a  later  UN led peace keeping  mission as well as facilitate ongoing  peace 
negotiations (Ekengaard 2008: 37). 
The crisis of Darfur  reached the Security  Council on  the 25th  of May  2004. The 
Council delivers a joint  statement  describing the situation in  Darfur  and expresses 
“... grave concern over the humanitarian and human rights  situation in Darfur” 
UN Security Council and Darfur
24 of 59
11  The agreements were later  included in  the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
The CPA  was signed by  both SPLM/A  and the  Government  of  Sudan in January  2005, 
and was a set  of  agreements collecting all  peace agreement protocols from July  2002 and 
on to december  2004. They  cover both security  issues, political  principles, power 
sharing, resource  sharing as well  as the implementation  of peace-keeping activities. 
Some of the most  significant  agreements was on the making of  the Government of Unity, 
consisting of  both SPLM/A and the  GoS and the agreement on the  implementation of 
peace-keeping missions from international organisations (AU & UN) (CPA, 2005)
demanding that “... those responsible be held accountable  ...”  (S/PV.4978). The 
Security  Council is furthermore “...  seriously concerned about continued logistical 
impediments prohibiting a rapid response … and calls  upon the Government of 
Sudan to fulfil its  announced commitment to cooperate fully …”  as well as they  are 
generally  concerned with  the “...  large-scale violations  of Human Rights  and 
International Humanitarian Law” (Ibid). 
Through  the next  meetings the language changes significantly  as the US Congress 
decide to term  the conflict in  Darfur  as Genocide. The US uses this argumentation in 
the Security  Council  calling  for  it  to “act quickly  and decisively” noting the 
importance of “not  [becoming] bogged down  over  words” (S/PV.5015). That 
language can be viewed as a  call for  stepping out  of normal politics  and a  transition 
to a  state of emergency.  That  language is followed by  the UK, Philippines,  Spain, 
Germany  and France that  also uses strong language stating  that  “the Security  Council 
must  be prepared to adopt  all  measures necessary”  and take “the responsibility  to 
help the State”  (Ibid).  Sanctions are also widely  discussed as necessary  action  if GoS 
does not  comply  with  the Security  Council’s decisions (S/PV.5027;40).  In  opposition 
we can  identify  China, Russia  and Pakistan  as mainly  focused on  sustaining the 
sovereignty  of the Sudan.  Their  use of language of security  is limited to that  of 
determining that  there is a humanitarian  crisis and violations of human  rights 
emphasising  on the role  of all  parties to de-escalate.  As to what should be done they 
are immensely  focused on  driving  through  a  political solution.  Russia  calls for a 
normalisation of the security  situation  from  the GoS and reiterates their  concern 
about  imposing sanctions as they  are impeding  to the political  negotiations (S/PV.
5040).  Later,  in  November, both  Norway  and the Netherlands, on behalf of the EU, 
“... strongly condemns all attacks on civilians ...” (emphasis added, S/PV.4978). 
The Security  Council adopts resolution  1556  and 1564  in  that  period.  1556  demands 
the GoS to,  acting  under  Chapter  VII12  of the UN charter, disarm  the Janjaweed 
militia,  the major  perpetrator of violence (S/RES/1556).  Chapter  VII allows the UN 
to impose sanctions which is also explicitly  mentioned as a  necessary  action  in  the 
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12  The UN  policy  of intervention, without the consent  of  the  member  state, does very 
rarely  happen although catered for  in Chapter  VII of the UN  Charter. It  determines what 
measures can be taken if  a threat  to the peace, breach of the peace  or  acts of aggression 
occurs (UN  Charter: 39-51). Article 41 describes the measures that  will  have to be taken 
first which include different  types of  sanctions. Article  42 goes on explaining that 
military  force  can be deployed if the former  measures proves inadequate. They  are 
however  also bound by  article  2.7  which does not  allow  for  any  intervention which is 
”essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (UN Charter: 2.7).
resolution. In  article 7  of the resolution  it  also decides that the sale of weapons to 
non-governmental parties,  including  Janjaweed,  should be prevented with  all  means. 
Importantly  it  also determines the crisis in Darfur  as a  security  threat,  focusing  on 
the violence against civilians perpetrated primarily  by  Janjaweed and JEM.  The 
resolution  speak of the acts through  a  language of condemnation: “... condemning all 
acts of violence and violations of Human  Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law” (S/RES/1556). 
These resolutions should be seen in  the light of the reluctant attitude of the GoS to 
comply  with  the commitments called for  by  the Security  Council,  especially  the 
disarmament of the Janjaweed as well  as restricting access for  humanitarian  workers 
on  the ground, as several  UN reports from  the Sec. Gen.  conclude (S/2004/703; S/
2004/787; S/2004/881).  Regarding sanctions, resolution  1564  is also concerned 
with  sanctioning  of the Sudanese petroleum  sector  - if the government does not 
accept an extended mandate of the AMIS (S/RES/1564).
Resolution  1564  initiates the Commission  of Inquiry  on  Darfur,  which  has the 
mission  to investigate whether  Genocide has been  committed. It  once again  explicitly 
calls for further  sanctioning,  under article  41, of individuals of the GoS or  the petrol 
sector  if the GoS does not start  cooperating (S/RES/1564).  These two resolutions are 
clearly  responding  to the situation  on  the ground where atrocities continue to 
happen  and in  some sense, the resolutions show  that  the crisis is considered to be in 
a  phase of armed conflict13. Thruelsen (2009: 20)  clusters the “normal”  measures of 
this phase and according  to his understanding Resolutions 1556  and 1564  does,  to a 
certain degree,  respond with  the adequate measures such  as sanctions, strong 
condemnation  of violence, disarmament  and the appointment  of a Special 
Representative  to the Secretary  General  (SRSG).  It  does however  only  use targeted 
sanctions on  individuals, it does not  talk  of peace enforcing  missions and is generally 
concentrated on the political process with strong  respect  for  the sovereignty  of 
Sudan. 
The general language in  the Security  Council  by  the end of 2004  is that  the situation 
is grave and requires immediate  actions.  The general  opinion  is that  it  is the 
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13  Armed conflict in this case being seen as the  phase of  a  conflict in which violence 
escalation, human rights violations, humanitarian crises, refugee situations and warring 
factions is present. For  a further elaboration  on the different  phases of conflict, see 
Thruelsen (ed.) 2009.
responsibility  of the GoS to handle the conflict, and that human  rights violations and 
the humanitarian  disaster  must  be stopped. However,  it is also the general opinion 
that  the solution shall  be found first  and foremost  in  the political negotiations. This is 
further  underlined by  UN officials such  as Jan  Pronk,  special representative for  the 
Secretary-General in  this case, when  he urges to “...  seek dialogue rather  than 
confrontation”. It  is also important to note that  outside of the Security  Council, UN 
officials,  Colin  Powell and especially  Kofi Annan, on  several  occasions throughout 
2004 14, urges the international society  to put  pressure on  the Sudanese Government 
to make sure they meet their commitments. 
In  terms of securitising  language, it  can  be logically  argued that the speech  made by 
the US representative in  July  2004  constitutes a  securitising move.  Urging the need 
to “Act  quickly  and decisively”, “not  get  bogged down  over  words”  and describing 
how  “...  the Government  of Sudan  has left us no choice.  It  has done the unthinkable. 
It has fostered an armed attack on  its own  civilian population”  shows how  the US 
tries to transfer the Darfur  crisis from  “normal politics”  to “panic politics” (Buzan, 
Wæver  & de Wilde 1998: 34) - thereby  attempting to legitimize exceptional 
measures. 
The US as a  Securitizing  Actor  uses an  organizational  logic in  the speech  act first 
making  the claim  that the GoS has “created a  humanitarian  disaster”  - because of 
that  Resolution 1556  is needed.  They  back  up their  claim  by  referring to data  showing 
the massive atrocities again  underlining  how  the GoS has not kept  their  promise to 
disarm  Janjaweed. This argumentation  puts the other  states in  a  situation  where they 
are obliged to act - otherwise they  are accepting the atrocities going  on.  Furthermore 
they identify the GoS as the threat against the people of Darfur, the referent object. 
Buzan, Wæver  & de Wilde’s focus on  the speech  act  as a  “...  combination  of language 
and society”  (1998: 32)  is also relevant  in  this situation. Given  the economic  and 
political power  of the US  they  fulfil  the role as a securitising actor  being  able to set 
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14  UN  officials such as Jan  Egeland, Jan  Pronk, James T. Morris and Bertrand 
Ramacharan on the 2. april, 4. may, 7. may, 26. may, 25. june, 7. july, 30. july, 5. october, 
urges that  international  pressure be put on  the  GoS, as “Khartoum made no progress last 
month in disarming the Janjaweed, stopping their  attacks or  prosecuting those 
responsible for  the worst atrocities” (Jan Pronk, October  5th, 2004, UN-News-2004). 
Colin Powell  and Kofi  Annan are also strong in their  language, again and again, urging 
the GoS to fulfill  commitments and that  international  presence in Darfur must be 
enlarged in order  to stop the atrocities (Kofi  Annan, September  3rd, 2004, UN-
News-2004)
the agenda.  Through  the original framework,  any  given  actor  could constitute a 
securitising  actor.  However,  in  the case of the Security  Council,  where a  part of the 
facilitating  conditions is the structure of the Council, with  its specific rules and 
norms, the situation  is somewhat  different. A  country  of the permanent five  will have 
a  stronger  position in terms of making  or impeding  securitising acts or  moves,  as 
they  are, because of the structure,  more powerful in  a political sense opposed to a 
non-permanent member.
The speech  act  addresses the whole Security  Council.  None the less some parts of the 
Audience are more important  than  others in  terms of coercion. The permanent  five 
are of course of great  importance,  given their  right to Veto a  draft resolution.  The 
facilitating  conditions between  the Sudan  and the Security  Council  are of major 
importance in  decisions on  possible sanctions, as the economic ties between Sudan 
and China  as well  as Russia are very  strong (Black & Williams 2010: 176; Badescu  & 
Bergholm  2009: 300). China and Russia has i.e.  been subject to intensive critique for 
not keeping the UN arms embargo as well  as their  strong  interests in  the Sudanese 
oil-sector  (Black & Williams 2010: 182).  It is therefore a  facilitating  condition, for 
any  decision, that  China and Russia does not veto.  That  is of course important  in  all 
matters but  as they  have strong  interests in  keeping  a  status quo in  the case of Darfur 
they  deserve special  attention - also if only  abstaining from  voting.  That China  and 
Russia  chose to abstain  from  voting on  the resolution could also be a  reason  for  why 
Sudan has proved themselves incapable or  unwilling  to disarm  the Janjaweed, 
despite the Chapter  VII mandate. That  point  has been made by  Badescu  & Bergholm 
regarding other resolutions trying to deal with the conflict (2009: 300). 
The referent object,  referred to by  the US,  is the people of Darfur, but  at  the same 
time, the representative refers to norms of the international society  as well.  He states 
that  the Security  Council will  cooperate with  the special representative for the 
Secretary-General “... to investigate human  rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian  law.”  (S/PV.5015).  Although connected, it  is important 
to note the distinction  between the territorial  or  culturally  defined people of Darfur, 
and the norms and ideas vested in  the international  society.  Referring  to norms and 
ideals can  be considered somewhat stronger, as they  are the foundation  on  which  an 
organisation like the UN is build. 
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The speech  act  by  the US can thus be considered a securitising  move following both 
the organisational logic  of the speech  as well  as the socio-political  capital  US 
possesses.  Whether we can  consider  it as a  successful securitisation  is on  the other 
hand more difficult  as it  is a question of whether  it  breaks free of the normal  rules 
and whether  the audience really  accepts the move. According  to the conflict cycle 
given  by  Thruelsen  (2009: 20)  we interpret  the phase of the conflict as the “Armed 
Conflict Phase”, characterised by  high  intensity  violence,  use of governmental force 
or  militia  etc. 15  The international society  would most  likely  act through 
condemnation, mediation as well as security  agreements (such as disarmament), 
peace enforcement, sanctions, arms embargo etc. 
Based on that  understanding  we do not  consider  the adoption  of Resolution 1556  as 
extraordinary  measures. They  simply  do not  break  free of normal politics and the 
audience does not  even  accept  the securitising  move fully.  Actually, they  adopt 
measures that  would normally  be taken  in an  earlier  phase of the conflict  (Thruelsen 
2009: 18).  It can  further be argued that the sanctions imposed is constructed from  a 
set  of rules or  norms generated through  earlier  conflicts.  The sanctions is thereby  a 
product of the bureaucratic development  within the UN and has become a  part  of 
normal politics and the toolbox with which the Security Council addresses conflicts.
Our  investigation  does,  in  that  light,  not  identify  a  successful  securitisation  within 
this period.  It  does identify  securitising  moves and the use of strong language 
regarding  the use of measures to comprehend the conflict. However,  this use of 
language does not  enable the proponents of such  an  approach to convince the 
audience to break free of the rules and thus legitimise extraordinary  measures. 
Conclusively, the full range of requirements for a securitisation is not fulfilled. 
2005: GENOCIDE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
During  the course of 2005  the crisis in  Darfur  receives further  attention  in  the 
Security  Council with  22  meetings opposed to 12  in  2004. The Security  Council 
decides to refer  the crisis in Darfur  to the International  Criminal Court,  calling for  an 
investigation of violations of human rights and international law.  The commission  of 
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15 We do that  on background of  the  fact, that in 2004 all  parties (except  the civilians) of 
the conflict  had arms and took  part in  active battles. Also several  reports and statements 
also referred to the  crisis as the “worst  humanitarian crisis in the world” (UN-News 
2004). 
inquiry  established in  2004  concludes that  the crisis can not  be defined as genocide. 
The Security  Council adopts,  during  march  2005, resolution  1590 which establishes 
the UNMIS16,  extending the already  existing  UNAMIS, in order  to contain the 
conflict between South Sudan and Khartoum (S/PV.5151). 
On  thursday  march  31st  2005,  the Security  Council adopts resolution  1593,  referring 
the situation in  Darfur  to the International Criminal Court (ICC). US,  China,  Algeria 
and Brazil  abstained from  voting.  This referral  is a special case in  this context,  as it  is 
drafted by  the UK only,  and, it  seems,  not widely  supported in terms of strong 
language for  the adoption  of the resolution. Before the draft, and the vote,  the only 
language referring  to this kind of action  is the utterances from  representatives calling 
for  an  end to impunity; the statements coming from  UN official, Guéhenno, Under-
Secretary-General for  Peacekeeping  Operations; and the recommendations coming 
from  the Commission of Inquiry  is the only  explicit  language about  a  referral to the 
ICC under the Rome Statute (S/PV.5151). 
The US,  however, is the only  western  democracy,  on  other  occasions consistently 
calling  for  action, that  abstains from  voting  on the referral  to the ICC,  stating that 
they  prefer  a  hybrid tribunal  rather  than  a  referral  to the ICC (S/PV.5158). 
Otherwise,  there is broad consensus between the western countries that a referral to 
the ICC is the way  forward, and is thus in  line with  the recommendations coming 
from  UN officials.  China is on  the same page as the US in  this case,  as is Algeria, 
arguing  that a  tribunal consisting  of an  african  panel  should be constructed - or  that 
the case simply be handed over to the national judiciary in Sudan itself.
The protagonists for  a  referral to the ICC is the UK, who also drafted the resolution, 
along  with a range of other  european and african  countries, based on  a  strong  ideal 
about  international law. France is concerned with  this referral constituting a 
significant stepping  stone in  sending  a  message that the international community 
will not let  violations of these norms and ideals go unpunished (S/PV.5154, S/PV.
5158). Benin  also expresses that “the African  Union  recognizes the Security  Council’s 
right  to exercise its international responsibility  to protect  a  population  when  that 
population’s Government  either  cannot  or  will not do so.  The rendering of justice is 
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16 Which consists of  10.000 UN  personnel  deployed to implement  and monitor the CPA. 
UNMIS was geographically constrained to South Sudan (UNMIS). 
an  element of that obligation.”  (S/PV.5158).  Doing  that  they  make a  clear connection 
between the responsibility to protect and the implementation of judicial measures. 
Regarding  interventionist measures it  should be noted that  AMIS, at  this time,  faced 
serious problems in  their  efforts to keep peace.  In  the areas they  were deployed peace 
was kept  but  they  had very  limited resources and could not keep the peace 
(Ekengaard 2008). That suggests that AU’s recognition of UN’s responsibility  to 
protect  could be viewed upon  as an  encouragement  to take further  action,  as AU in 
their  own  efforts could not  succeed. That  argument  is strengthened by  the AU 
representative Kingibe who, earlier  in  2005,  gave support for  both  the deployment of 
a  UN peace support  mission  as well as highlighted the fact that the international 
community  “...  risks allowing  the guilty  to escape punishment  simply  because there is 
no consensus on the appropriate  forum  in which  to prosecute the crimes”  (S/PV.
5120). 
The Sudanese government argues that  the referral to the ICC is a  sign of western 
superiority  and means of tyrannising  Sudan, thus upholding  that the international 
community  constitutes somewhat of a  threat  to the Sudan,  in  that  they  are violating 
their sovereignty when interfering in their internal affairs (ibid.).
Another  significant event during 2005  is made up by  the Commission of Inquiry  on 
Darfur,  established in  resolution  1564,  declaring that  the situation in Darfur  can  not 
be termed as a  genocide, however still stating  that  this does not  exclude individuals 
of being  prosecuted for  acts of genocide,  and makes clear that  large scale “war  crimes 
and crimes against  humanity  had been  committed by  Sudanese Government  officials 
and by  the Janjaweed militia.”  (S/PV.5125).  In  terms of identifying and deciding  on 
which  measures to implement to handle the conflict, the conclusion  that  the situation 
on  the ground in Darfur cannot  be termed as genocide is important.  Important 
because the definition of a  crisis as genocide legitimises measures that can  handle 
the gravity  of the crisis in  other  ways than  measures to handle an  ethnic,  social or 
political armed conflict.
In  terms of sanctions,  the situation  in  the Security  Council has not changed 
considerably  since 2004. Russia  and China are still against imposing  sanctions - 
China  explicitly  stating that  they  have “repeatedly  stressed that the Security  Council 
should exercise the greatest  caution  with respect to “measures”  that could make 
negotiations more difficult  and have a  negative impact on the peace process.”  (S/PV.
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5153).  Russia  reiterates their  concern about the sanctions creating  obstacles for  the 
peace process; that  the focus should be on  promoting  this process and “Sanctions 
against the Sudanese Government  are hardly  likely  to promote that.”  (ibid.).  Thus,  in 
their  speeches to the Security  Council they  are strongly  focused on  furthering  the 
political process and peace negotiations rather  than  impeding  this process by 
imposing  sanctions on  people that  are  a  part  of this progress (S/PV.5153,  S/PV.5154, 
S/PV.5158).
Going  through  the meetings in  2005  and determining the strength  of the language 
uttered in  the speeches,  the most  prominent use of strong language is coming  from 
UN officials.  Kofi Annan, in  his speech  to the Security  Council  on  16  February  states 
that  “...  while the United Nations may  not  be able  to take humanity  to heaven,  it  must 
act  to save humanity  from  hell”.  He goes on stating  that  the responsibility  to act  on 
the crisis is in  the hands of the Security  Council,  and that “the full range of options 
should be on  the table”  (S/PV.5125).  This type of language is also apparent  in  the 
speeches given  by  Jan  Pronk to the Security  Council,  however  the strong  language is 
toned down  compared to that  of 2004.  In  his speeches he is focused on furthering 
the political  negotiations, and during  the middle and end of the period he is quite 
optimistic and positive about developments (S/PV.5231). 
Regarding  securitising  moves in  2005  the massive representation  of UN officials in 
Security  Council meetings is quite important.  During  the process of the referral  to 
the ICC,  the only  proponents speaking  publicly  of such  are UN officials. 
Furthermore,  it is the UN officials, Jan  Pronk,  Arbour 17 and Guéhenno, that initially 
suggests such  a  referral. Seen  in  relation  to the fact  that the referral is termed to be in 
close connection to the resolution  of the conflict,  these moves (speeches) by  UN 
officials to promote a referral  constitutes securitising moves. This pattern  is 
consistent  in  the case of the meetings leading  up to the adoption  of Resolution  1593 
where the only  actors that could be identified as securitising actors are UN Officials. 
Through  the first  three meetings Jan  Pronk consistently  explains how  the GoS has 
not complied with  former  resolutions and how  the conflict might  escalate further 
“unless swift  action  is taken  and new  approaches are considered”  (S/PV.5109; S/PV.
5119; S/PV.5120). That  is followed up by  Louise Arbour who considers the recent 
developments as a  “blueprint  for  action”,  calls for  action and “strongly  recommends 
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17  Louise Arbour is a member  of the commission of  enquiry  established to investigate 
whether  the crisis in Darfur  could be considered genocide, and consequently  come up 
with recommendations for action to the Security Council.
that  the Security  Council  refer  the situation  in  Darfur  to the ICC” as “crimes have 
been  - and it  appears,  continue to be - perpetrated on  a  widespread and systematic 
basis by  Government officials and Janjaweed leaders  …”  (S/PV.5125).  Guéhenno 
also recommends a  referral to the ICC  (S/PV.5137).  UN Officials thus suddenly 
appear as the main securitising actors in this situation.
The referent  object in  2005  is clearly  the same as in  2003-2004. The referent object 
mainly  used is the people of Darfur,  and it  can  be argued that  this referent  object is 
the underlying  referent  object  when  other  objects are referred to as well.  In the case 
of the referral  to the ICC,  the referent object  must  be said to be judicial norms and 
ideals of the international  society  as defined in  international  law. However, these 
norms are constituted and is referred to in  this case,  if not  for  resolving  the conflict, 
then  in  order  to bring  some kind of justice to the people of Darfur.  It  is though  the 
same kind of logic  that applies - if nothing  is done about  this,  in  this situation  and in 
this moment, it  will create precedence for  future crises making  this norm  irrelevant. 
Doing  this,  it  becomes what the CS considers an existential threat,  in  that  the norms 
will lose their  meaning (existence) if nothing  is done (Wæver  1995).  It  thus becomes 
clear  that Darfur  is definitely  dealt  with  as a security  issue and qualifies for  being 
securitised.
In  relation  to the strong  relevance of UN officials in  the referral,  the audience slightly 
changes character.  It  is no longer  the ‘rest’ of the Security  Council as in  2004, but 
rather  the whole of the Council  that  is addressed. In  this context,  it  is then  also a 
different set  of facilitating conditions that  apply.  A  member  of the Security  Council 
must  accept  the idea  of referring  the situation to the ICC  and draft  a  resolution to 
address the matter.  This happens and UK drafts resolution  1593  and it is adopted. 
This securitisation  can  to a  high  degree be considered successful as the referral  of an 
ongoing  conflict  to the ICC is unprecedented and is continually  being described as a 
“historic resolution”  (S/PV.5158).  We therefore regard it  as partly  breaking  free from 
“normal politics” because of its unprecedented nature. 
Conclusively, despite its success, this securitisation can also be regarded as 
somewhat  weak.  It is weak because the resolution  is only  drafted by  one nation, not 
by  a  collective of representatives.  It is weak because it  is not voted for by  the whole 
Council, and especially  because the US and China  abstained.  Thus we can  not  regard 
the opinions in  the resolution  fully  adopted by  these abstaining states.  This weakness 
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becomes apparent in  2008 when  the prosecutor  Moreno Ocampo reveals that he has 
got  sufficient  evidence to prosecute Omar Al-Bashir  with  charges of genocide. This 
causes much  debate and controversies within  the security  council that discusses 
whether to defer  the arrest-warrant (S/PV.5996,  S/PV.6003,  S/PV.6010).  Again,  it  is 
important to note  how  this case of securitisation  have been  acted out  by  UN officials 
with the security council as the audience. 
2006: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT DARFUR? 
The Darfur  Peace Agreement  (DPA) 18 was signed in  May  2006  by  the Government of 
National Unity  and the SLM (Sudanese Liberation  Movement). The DPA is 
important to note as it was a  major step forward for  the solution  of the conflict  but 
was unfortunately  violated few  days after  the signing. That was issued as one of the 
reasons for  letting a  UN Mission  take over  the strained AMIS mandate (S/PV.5434). 
Kofi Annan explicitly  urged the Security  Council that  it “must and will speed up [its] 
planning  for  the transition  to a  United Nations operation  in  Darfur“  (Ibid.: 3). 
Calling  for  immediate action Kofi Annan  was following  a pattern  of stronger 
language that characterised 2006.
On the 26th  of April  Responsibility  to Protect  was reaffirmed in  resolution  1674  and 
that  its decision  has been  possible to identify  also in  the discourse on  Darfur. 
Although  Kofi Annan  have spoken  of the responsibility  of the International 
Community  to help Darfur  before 2006  (2005-4), a  pattern  is suddenly  visible in 
2006  where countries like Denmark,  US,  UK, Ghana,  Peru  and Slovakia explicitly 
refers to the agreement  on the International responsibility  to protect  the citizens of 
Darfur  when the Government of the Sudan  failed to do just  that. This is jump-started 
by  the Secretary  of State for  US,  Condoleezza  Rice’s speech  to the Security  Council on 
9 May:
“This  is a time of testing for the  international community, especially for the 
United Nations [...] If the idea of an international community is  to mean 
anything, if the  founding principles of the  United Nations are to be  more 
than just dreams and if the notion of our responsibility to protect the  weakest 
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18  Also in some occasions referred to, as the  Abuja Peace Agreements. The DPA  was 
signed by  the  SPLM and the NCP, and establishes a cease  fire  commission, concerned 
with the delivery  of  humanitarian assistance, maintains the AMIS as military  observers 
for implementing the humanitarian ceasefire (Ekengaard 2008: 14).
and the  most powerless among us is  ever to be  more  than just an empty 
promise, then the Security Council must act.” 
(S/PV.5434)
This is further  supported by  Austria  saying that  “[they] have a  responsibility  towards 
the people of Darfur: to give them  hope and to make peace in  Darfur  a  reality”  (ibid.) 
A third and even more vivid point in this relation is that of the UK, made on 15 June:
“We  are  very pleased that this is the  first Security Council resolution 
mandating a United Nations peacekeeping operation to make an explicit 
reference  to this responsibility. It has always been, and it remains, the 
primary responsibility of the  Government of the  Sudan to ensure  the security 
of its own citizens. Over the past few years, it manifestly has not done so.” 
(S/PV.5462)
This above statement,  and their  later  statements arguing  that  the responsibility  of 
the implementation  of the DPA  should lie with  the Security  Council,  since they  are 
the only  institution  capable of doing so (S/PV.5528), clearly  exemplifying  this new 
language about the Responsibility  to Protect  norm. On the opposite side of the court, 
China,  Russia  and Qatar  are still in  opposition  to this strong language - here 
explained through the language of the Chinese representative:
“To address and resolve  the Darfur crisis, we  need to bear in mind both a 
sense of urgency and a sober assessment of the complexity of the issue.” 
(S/PV.5519)
This statement exemplifies two things: It is an  example of the Chinese reluctance 
towards implementing drastic,  violating  measures against Sudan,  but  at  the same 
time reiterate their  concern  about  the urgency  with  which  the situation  should be 
handled.  Thus exemplifying the ideological discrepancy  between China  and the ideals 
vested in the R2P norm.
In Resolution 1706,  in which  members of the Council agree on, supported by  the 
African  Union, transforming  the AMIS into a UN mission19  they  explicitly  recall 
Resolution  1674, and thereby  their  own  responsibility  to protect  the citizens of 
Darfur  (S/RES/1706).  Doing that  they  subscribe the resolution to paragraph  138 & 
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19  By  extending the  already  existing UNMIS to the  Darfur  region in which it  at the time 
was not allowed by the Government of the Sudan. 
139  of the 2005  World Summit  Outcome Document  describing  how  they  are “... 
prepared to take collective action  … should peaceful  means be inadequate and 
national authorities manifestly  fail  to protect their  populations from  genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic  cleansing  and crimes against  humanity”  (UN 2005).  They  do not, 
however, allow  for  the resolution  to be fully  implemented without  the consent of the 
Sudanese Government.  Through  that  they  interpret  the situation  as not  so grave as to 
implement the full strength  of the Responsibility  to Protect  norm, invoking  an 
intervention that impede on the sovereignty of the Sudan without its consent. 
The resolution was drafted by  Argentina, Denmark,  France,  Ghana,  Greece,  Slovakia, 
the UK,  Tanzania  and the US with  an  ambition  to deploy  17  300  military  and 3  300 
civilian  police personnel to Darfur on  a  Chapter  VII mission  (Ibid.).  Considering the 
earlier  measures taken this resolution  clearly  stands out  with  a thoroughly  worked 
through  plan for  the mission  and is considered very  ambitious (Kreps 2010: 69-70). 
However  it  is also criticised for  failing  to fully  implement  the idea of Responsibility  to 
Protect as it  invited the consent  of the GoS to actually  employ  the mission  (Kreps 
2010: 70; Badescu  & Bergholm  2009: 300). This follows the fact  that  China,  Russia 
and Qatar,  two of the permanent  five, abstains from  voting on  the resolution. 
Badescu  & Bergholm  makes the argument  that  China’s strong  economic  ties with 
Sudan weakens the resolution by  their  choice to abstain  from  voting  (Badescu  & 
Bergholm  2009: 300). Whether  it  is because of Realpolitik  or the ideal of 
Sovereignty, consent is far  from  present  in  the reactions of Sudan that  regards the 
resolution  as “illegitimate”  arguing  that it  is based on  “flawed speculation”  (S/PV.
5520).  Thus, reestablishing the threat  constituted by  international  society’s decision 
to violate their  territorial and sovereign integrity  claiming again  and again  that they 
“will not  rest  until peace and security  are restored throughout  Darfur”  (Ibid.).  It  is 
also important  to note that the Chinese and Russian  votes constitute facilitating 
conditions - if they abstain it is likely that the resolution will not have much success. 
The first  sanctions towards specific  persons in Sudan, made possible in resolution 
1591, is imposed in  resolution 1672.  The sanctions are imposed on  four  persons,  two 
from  each  “side”  of the conflict  (S/PV.5423),  and consists of economic sanctions as 
well  as impediments towards entry  in  member  countries.  The US representative 
refers to this adoption as being  an  “important  first  step [for  the international 
community]  to fulfil its responsibilities”  concerning  Darfur  (ibid.).  Russia,  China  and 
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Qatar  once again  abstained from  voting, because of ideological  differences,  here 
epitomised by the Chinese representative: 
“Past practices  and experiences reveal that, more  often than not, sanctions 
cannot reach expected results. On the contrary, sanctions victimize  civilian 
populations.” 
(ibid.). 
The political representatives change their  language during  2006 to a  focus on  the 
responsibility  to protect. The representatives time and again urge the GoS to consent 
on  the deployment of a  Chapter  VII UN peacekeeping  mission  in  Darfur. They  argue 
that  the government  has already  accepted a  UN mission in  the Sudan  before 
(UNMIS),  and thereby  accepted their  inability  to handle the conflict. China even  tries 
to convince the GoS,  that the UN is only  trying  to help implement  the peace 
agreement, why they give their consent to the mission (S/PV.5520). 
There is one important  note to make about the discursive developments during 
2006: While the political representatives develop a language, highly  inspired by  the 
Responsibility  to Protect,  and used extensively  as an  argument for  doing something, 
the UN officials (apart  from  Kofi  Annan, who also used this language in  2005) are 
not a part of this discourse, and does not undergo the same development. 
Identifying  the securitising  moves in  2006, we see a  change in the facilitating 
conditions, the organisational  logic of the speech  acts and a  discrepancy  in rhetorics 
between  the UN Officials and the State Representatives. We will  in  this section  try  to 
describe both  the changes, how  they  are apparent  in  the discourse and whether  they 
have had an impact on the action taken. 
The strong  language referring  to the R2P during 2006  can  be considered as 
securitising  moves, attempting  to legitimise this collective  action  defined in  the 
norm,  by  implementing  Responsibility  to Protect  in  the organisational logic  of their 
speeches. This reference to norms in  the speeches does however not  change the 
referent  object of the securitisation  act  - it  is still the people of Darfur. Their 
significance have though  somehow  changed with  the organisational logic of the 
speech  act.  As the speeches made by  specifically  the US on  9  May  and the UK on  15 
June exemplify,  they  are now  not only  invoking  sympathy  but  becoming  part  of a 
legal  argument, legitimising extraordinary  measures - If these are the rules that 
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apply,  then  they  are  obliged to take this action.  Once again, by  referring  to norms, 
ideals and laws, they make it an existential threat. 
If looking  at  the events in  Darfur  and the reports released by  both  UN and other 
bodies one can  argue that  the Responsibility  to Protect  should have played a  bigger 
role  concerning the implementation  of measures20.  This fails to happen for  two main 
reasons: First  of all  the securitising move,  in  terms of coercion  of the audience, is 
unsuccessful.  The coercion  of the audience fails,  not  because nothing is done,  but 
because the measures taken, as earlier,  cannot  be defined as extraordinary  nor 
corresponding  to the rhetorics used when  identifying the crisis. By  relating to article 
41  and not  42  of the UN Charter 21 the Security  Council  implies that  the measures 
taken  earlier  have proven  to be effective,  despite the fact that  neither  imposed 
sanctions and demands for  disarmament (specifically  those of resolution  1556) have 
been  held by  the Government  of the Sudan.  That is one of the clearest  examples of 
the discrepancy between the rhetorics and action. 
A  second reason  is the fact that  despite the frequent  use of and referral to 
Responsibility  to Protect,  when describing  the conflict, no measures agreed upon in 
2006  results in  any  significant  change in  action.  The most important  decision  is the 
adoption  of Resolution  1706, a  Chapter  VII mandate resolution, which calls for  the 
extension of the UNMIS to also cover  Darfur  and take over  the work now  done by 
AMIS. That  decision however  does not result in  any  action  on  the ground as the GoS 
does not  give its consent  to the mission  since the resolution, despite recalling 
Resolution 1674, only allows for intervention with the consent of the Government. 
In  2005  the leaders of the world agreed on  their: “Willingness  to take timely and 
decisive collective action [to  protect populations from  genocide, war crimes,  ethnic 
cleansing and crimes  against humanity], through the Security Council,  when 
peaceful means  prove  inadequate and national authorities  are manifestly failing to 
do so.” (UN 2005: 1).  Resolution  1674, in  which  R2P is adopted, is thus watered 
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20  This argument follows the logic that  Commission of Inquiry  on  Darfur  and other 
reports have concluded that  “large scale war  crimes and crimes against  humanity  have 
been committed by  Sudanese Government Officials and Janjaweed leaders” (S/PV.5125). 
According to Paragraph 138 and 139 of  the  World Summit Outcome Document  these 
crimes should invoke R2P and compel the UN to act and stop the atrocities. 
21 Article 41  allows for  sanctions such  as “interruption of  economic relations and of  rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of  communication, and the severance 
of  diplomatic  relations” while Article 42 allows for  action with  force, should the 
“measures provided for in Article 41 [...]  be inadequate” (UN Charter). 
down when  used in  Resolution  1706, as pointed out  by  Badescu  & Bergholm  (2009: 
306). The Security  Council thus regards the Sovereignty  of Sudan  as more important 
than  their  agreement on  Responsibility  to Protect  and tries to incorporate  it  in  a  less 
radical version - seeking consent.
To sum  up,  the attempts to securitise the conflict  during 2006  is much  like the ones 
during  2003-2006,  but with  the significant  difference,  that  the language from  the 
representatives of the member  countries adopt  specific R2P language.  As we can see 
from  the above,  the R2P norm  has had an  effect on  the language visualised in the 
changing  organisational logic of the securitising  actors speeches now  referring  to the 
suffering  of the people as part  of a legal argument. The drastic  change in discourse, 
however, does not  bring  change to the action  taken where the members of the 
security  council still abides by  article 41  as adequate measures for  solving  the conflict 
and not  allowing for an  intervention  despite the fact  that  the GoS again  and again 
fails to comply  fully  with  the demands implemented in  the resolutions. Consequently 
we cannot identify any successful securitising attempts. 
2007: ARREST WARRANTS AND THE UN/AU MISSION IN DARFUR
2007  was characterised by  only  14  meetings while significant  events took place.  The 
unprecedented United Nations & African  Union Mission  in  Darfur (UNAMID) was 
agreed upon and most  importantly  consented to by  the Government  of the Sudan. 
Furthermore the ICC prosecutor  Moreno-Ocampo issued the first arrest  warrants 
after  the  Security  Council  in  2005  referred Darfur  to the ICC.  The year  is otherwise 
consisting  of meetings in  which  the Security  Council adopts extending  resolutions of 
mandates already agreed on.
On 7  June,  Mr. Moreno-Ocampo addresses the Security  Council for  the first  time in 
2007. He informs the Council that evidence has been  handed over  to the judges, and 
that  arrest  warrants for  the former  minister  of state  of Sudan,  Ahmad Harun,  and Ali 
Kushayb, a militia/Janjaweed leader,  has been  issued. These arrest  warrants are 
issued on  the background, that the two indicted should have joined in  the 
persecution and attacks on  civilian  darfuris. Harun,  who later was promoted to the 
position  of Minister  of State for  Humanitarian  Affairs, had allegedly  organised 
systems which  aim  it was to supply  Janjaweed militias with  weapons and joined the 
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Sudanese Armed Forces in  committing  “massive crimes”  against  the population of 
Darfur (S/PV.5687).
On December  5, the last  meeting  in  2007,  Moreno-Ocampo is once again  presenting 
his work to the Security  Council.  He states that  the GoS has failed to comply  with  its 
legal  obligation  to cooperate with  the ICC in  taking action  to perform  arrests of the 
two officials. And as Moreno-Ocampo states: “Even more serious,  there are 
expressions of support  in  Khartoum  in  Harun’s favor”  (S/PV.5789), strongly 
implying that  Harun  has the support  of the GoS itself.  He also states that  Harun  had 
been  taken in for  questioning, but  that  no evidence of his guilt  had been found,  and 
that  “the Prosecutor  had no jurisdiction  there; he was an  intruder.”  (S/PV.5789). 
This position  on  the issue taken  by  the GoS is during  this second meeting  widely 
condemned by  the representatives in  the Security  Council,  and some countries 
suggest to formalise  an  answer coming from  the Security  Council  if the GoS won’t 
comply  with the ICC.  The US uses strong  language in  terms of the judicial element of 
the conflict  when  they  state that  “The United States believes strongly  in the need for 
accountability  for  acts  of genocide, war  crimes and crimes against  humanity 
committed in  Darfur”  (ibid.), once again emphasising  the US Congress decision of 
defining  the situation  in  Darfur  as genocide. Russia  argues that the ICC is too 
focused on  one side of the conflict, and that  they  should focus on  investigating  crimes 
committed by  the rebel groups in  order  to reestablish  trust between  the two parties 
(ibid.). 
In  July  the Security  Council  adopts Resolution  1769  in  which  they  make agreements 
between  the AU and the UN on  the unprecedented joint  mission  UNAMID. UNAMID 
is equipped with  a  Chapter  VII mandate making it  not only  peace-keeping  but  also 
able to enforce peace when  breached.  The US described the decision as “the 
culmination of intense efforts by  many  in  the international community  over  the past 
several months”  (S/PV.5727).  Importantly  the resolution was unanimously  adopted 
and followed by  strong language. US was explicitly  critical towards the Government 
of Sudan  and its former  complete lack of cooperation. They  ended up stating  that “if 
the Sudan does not  comply  with  this resolution, the United States will move for  the 
swift  adoption of unilateral  and multilateral  measures”  (Ibid.: 8). Black  & Williams 
(2010: 158-59) along  with  Kírály  (2010: 25) argue that the strong  US position  has 
been  a product of the civil society  pressure that  had its early  start  in  2004  and 
developed to a  massive movement  in  2005  with  the Save Darfur  Coalition. This was 
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epitomised in  the world media  by  George Clooneys speech  to the Security  Council 
during  a  closed meeting in  2006  (Kírály  2010: 25).  This threat  of extending sanctions 
is made real when  the US in  May  2007,  decides to amp up their  economic  bilateral 
sanctions (Black & Williams 2010: 162).  The agreement  of Resolution  1769  is thus a 
product of an  incremental process, starting with  the recognition  that  peace keeping 
troops are needed in  2006  with  the adoption of resolution  1706, extending UNMIS to 
Darfur.  As the GoS did not give their  consent  other  options had to be considered and 
tried culminating  with  the unanimous agreement on the establishment of UNAMID 
in resolution 1769. 
It was though emphasised again  and again  that  the adoption  of res. 1769  by  the 
Security  Council,  did not in itself provide protection  for  the people of Darfur  - action 
from  the members was also needed (S/PV.5784).  Actualising  resolution  1769  did also 
entail difficulties.  One issue was the lack of troop contributions to the UNAMID 
another was the continued restrictions to mobility  and communication  and other 
practicalities from  the Government of Sudan. For  the mission  to be successful these 
issues had to be dealt  with,  implying that both the members of the Security  Council 
as well as the Government of the Sudan had issues that it needed to address. 
In  terms of the security  language used in  the Security  Council during 2007,  it 
remained unchanged to some extent. The focus during  2007  is,  apart from  the 
adoption  of resolution  1769, on  the implementation  of the different  already  adopted 
resolutions. Once again  the Security  Council  strongly  urges,  that the GoS must 
cooperate with  the Council  and the ICC. But the Security  Council remains divided on 
the ideas of the fundamental approach  to the crisis in Sudan,  with Russia,  China  and, 
during 2007, Qatar and an informal coalition22 on the other. 
2007  is also characterised by  efforts of the UN Security  Council to find a  solution  that 
can  bring troops on  the ground in Darfur.  With  the adoption of resolution  1706  in 
august  2006  it  became clear that  a  solution  to the conflict  in  Darfur would have to 
incorporate peace keeping  or  even  peace enforcing troops from  the UN. Black  & 
Williams (2010: 93) argue that  the failure of Resolution  1706  was a  result  of “...  US 
domestic political  urgency  to ‘do something’...”  opposed by  “...  a  strong  chinese 
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22 Consisting of: The UK, The US, Germany, France, Belgium, Slovakia, Peru, Denmark, 
Ghana, Panama, Italy  and others. South  Africa being the  only  country  seemingly 
reluctant  to take a strong stand on anything else  than focusing on the political 
negotiations as the most important.
desire to protect a  client from  an  unwelcome UN force  ...”.  The adoption  of 
Resolution  1769  builds on  the failure of Resolution 1706  and is thus not  the product 
of new  securitising  moves but  rather  an incremental political process.  The political 
measures taken involves formal as well as informal meetings between  the Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon  and Omar  Al-Bashir.  Already  in  November  2006, Addis 
Ababa,  the GoS,  on  a  high-level meeting,  accepts the framework of the 3  stage plan 
involving: light and heavy  support  packages23 for  the AMIS after  which it  should be 
joined with  a  UN military  component  (UN Fact).  The agreement  on what  countries 
should contribute to the missions are not  discussed in  the Security  Council  until 
resolution  1769  is adopted - it  is a  product of the political play  between the member 
states, the bureaucracy and Sudan. 
In  the light of the securitisation framework,  2007  does not entail any  significant 
cases of securitisation.  The processes taking  place are mostly  a  matter  of clearing the 
road for a peace keeping force in Darfur. 
2008: POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE INDICTMENT OF OMAR AL-BASHIR
There is a  number  of significant  events during  2008, both  in  discursive and historical 
terms. First  of all,  implications of cooperation between  the GoS and the Security 
Council continues to create obstacles for  the implementation of UNAMID.  Secondly, 
UN officials change their  focus onto the political negotiations. Lastly, the President  of 
the Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir  is indicted by  the ICC  for  crimes against  humanity  and 
human rights violations.
Troubles with  troop contributions was a major issue in  2008. It  was again  and again 
reiterated how  resolutions could not solve the problem  alone (S/PV.5832; S/PV.
5849; S/PV.5872).  Guéhenno24  reminds the security  council that  “UNAMID is 
severely  under-resourced for  the tasks that it  was mandated to perform”  (S/PV.5832: 
6). That  concern  is raised by  many  parties and it  is clear that  despite the collective 
political support  for  UNAMID it  is difficult to muster  the same will when troops and 
equipment  are needed.  Although  a great lack of contributions are obvious,  lack  of 
UN Security Council and Darfur
42 of 59
23  Light and Heavy  Support  packages consists of  troop contributions to the  AMIS 
mission. The LSP consists of  187  military, police and civilian police. HSP consists of 
almost 4000 personnel. (UN Fact). 
24 Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operations
cooperation from  the GoS is also part  of the problem. The GoS repeatedly,  continued 
to enforce restrictions on  land access,  communication  and did not  sign  the Status of 
Forces Agreement 25 until February  2008,  7  months after  giving  consent  to UNAMID. 
That  and a series of cease-fire violations from  the GoS was subject  to strong critique 
throughout 2008 expressed by  both  UN officials as well as state representatives (S/
PV.5849). 
In  June,  Jan Eliasson, Special  Envoy  for  the Secretary-General  for  Darfur and Salim 
Ahmed Salim, Special  Envoy  of the African  Union  for  Darfur,  is present at  a  meeting 
in  the Security  Council and puts forth  their  statements about  the situation  in Darfur. 
Eliasson  has a heavy  focus on  the political  process and the peace negotiations in  his 
statement.  He argues that “A  well-prepared high-level international  meeting  could 
play  a  positive catalyst role  in  that  respect” also referring to “an  urgent  need for 
outside actors - International  organizations,  Member  States and especially  members 
of this Council”  (S/PV.5922). Salim  is on  the same page as Eliasson  concerning  the 
political process and is highly  focused on getting  the peace negotiations restarted.  He 
goes on  to stating  that the key  priority,  or  concern, for  Darfurians is security, and 
that  the UNAMID is highly  anticipated by  the civilian  population  in  Darfur. “[It]  is 
therefore all  the more regrettable that  such  a  deployment  has been  agonizingly  slow 
… due to the position  of the Government of the Sudan  on  such  matters as the 
composition  of the force and others due to the failure of the international community 
to act decisively.”  (ibid.).  However,  Salim  further  argues that  the negotiations is of 
first  importance,  as he says: “Above all,  [UNAMID] will  need a  peace to keep; hence 
the crucial importance of the political process.” (ibid.)
This discursive change towards a  focus on the political  process is not only  present  in 
the statements of UN officials, but also in the statements coming  from  the 
representatives in  the Security  Council. Although, there are still  some countries using 
strong language when determining  the situation, there is a  shift  towards focus on  the 
the mediation  and political efforts rather  than  on  interventionist  measures.  Along 
with  the regular proponents of “political solutions”, such as China  and Russia, we 
suddenly  see South  Africa, Vietnam,  Burkina Faso,  Indonesia  and the UK also 
focusing strongly  on  this. As Mr.  Sawers, the UK representative puts it: “We have to 
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25  The SOFA establishes the rights and privileges of the UNAMID, such as 
communication rights, use of aircrafts etc. 
do everything we can  to keep the CPA  on track,  and the United Nations can  do more 
in that respect.” (ibid.)
France, US and Belgium  are the only  countries adversely  against  this sudden  focus 
on  the political progress.  It  is not that  they  directly  oppose political negotiations, but 
they  have a  very  pessimistic  view  of it  as a  successful means to the end. The US 
expresses that they  do not  believe in  political progress in  an environment  with  the 
current security  situation, stating that  “without security  - or  improved security, as we 
will not  be able to have perfect security  for  some time to come - everything  is at 
risk.”  (ibid.). To sum  up we see a  split between  a  fraction  of countries focusing  on  a 
political solution and another fraction prioritising  peace on  the ground as a  necessity 
for successful political solutions.
The ICC prosecutor  Moreno-Ocampo presents his findings and a  status on  his 
investigations in  June 2008.  He criticises the GoS for  not  cooperating with the ICC, 
and states that “Sudanese officials insist that  the ICC has no jurisdiction  over 
Darfur”  (S/PV.5817),  and thereby  opposing  resolution  1593, wherein  the GoS is 
urged to comply  and “cooperate fully  with  … the Court  and the Prosecutor”  (S/RES/
1593).  The prosecutor, in  his statement  uses strong  language and reiterates his 
earlier statements regarding the persecution of Darfuri civilians by the GoS:
“Citizens from the  Sudan are being deliberately attacked by the  Sudanese 
officials. In the  words of Harun, the  people  of Darfur are  the enemy. Their 
own State  is attacking them. If the  international community does not protect 
the Darfuris, they will be eliminated” 
(S/PV.5817)
The reaction from  the Security  Council is dramatic. A  range of countries respond 
with  strong  language against  the  GoS, and about  the situation  on  the ground. Costa 
Rica  refers to the GoS as “toying  with  human  dignity, toying  with  the authority  of this 
Council.”  (ibid.).  Panama  goes so far as to consider  the situation in  Darfur  as 
genocide when  stating  their concern,  after  hearing  the prosecutor's statement, that 
“the violence against unarmed civilians, the impunity  of the perpetrators of the 
violence and their  protection  by  the Government  could lead to the disappearance of 
the people of Darfur.”  and goes on  to say  “If that  is not  genocide,  I do not  know  what 
else to call it.”  (ibid.).  Once again  the GoS is identified as posing an  existential threat 
against the people of Darfur. 
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In  the case of the referral to the ICC, a  broader  range of countries have reservations, 
in  comparison to earlier  decisions made by  the Security  Council. Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Libya and Burkina  Faso accompanies Russia  and China  in  stating that the 
Sovereignty  of the Sudan  should be respected and that  strong  cooperation  between 
the ICC and the GoS should be established and maintained (S/PV.5905).  The Libyan 
representative goes so far  as to say  that “In many  cases, those accusations [made by 
the prosecutor  in  his report] are based on  press and political  reports. To date,  there 
have been  no findings or  conclusions with  regard to investigations into the practices 
of the rebel  movements.”  thus arguing  that  the prosecutor  is not in  a  position  to 
prove anything,  and a  decision  based upon  these accusations  is not  commendable 
(ibid.). 
In  July  2008, the prosecutor  applied for  arrest  warrant  to the ICC,  for  the President 
of the Sudan Omar  Al-Bashir.  The following  issuance of arrest  warrants, on charges 
of war  crimes and crimes against  humanity,  marks a  turning  point,  in  that  it  is the 
first  time ever  an incumbent  state leader  is indicted by  the ICC (Black & Williams 
2010: 147-148). The reactions to these arrest  warrants within  the Security  Council 
are massive and divided.  The use of article 16,  relating to the ability  of the Security 
Council to defer  the arrest  warrants issued, is discussed and there is a general 
critique of the decision  to issue the warrants, as it  is ”an  inappropriate decision taken 
at  an  inappropriate time”  as China  terms it (S/PV.5947).  During  this meeting 
resolution  1828  is adopted, with only  one country,  the US, abstaining.  The resolution 
extends the mandate of UNAMID and urges the GoS to remove all restrictions and 
cooperate with  the UN. The US abstains from  voting arguing  that  the resolution 
“would send the wrong  signal  to Sudanese President Al-Bashir  and undermine efforts 
to bring  him  and others to justice”  (ibid.).  The US believes the resolution  is too vague 
and instead demands  of the GoS to “accept all troop contributions without 
reservations” and thus “comply fully with all Security Council resolutions” (Ibid.). 
During  the rest  of the year,  the division  within  the Security  Council  on  the ICC 
question  becomes even more visible.  On one side of the discussion there are 
proponents of an  increased focus on the peace process and the political negotiations. 
As Russia  emphasises: “There is a  need to balance the demands of personal 
responsibility  and the interests of the peace process.”  (S/PV.6028).  On the other  side 
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are the countries committed to combat  impunity  in  the conflict,  and sees that  as a 
part of the resolution of the conflict. 26 
In  terms of securitising moves and acts during  2008, the picture is a  bit  complex. 
The ICC prosecutor  does,  through  his speeches and accounts of the ongoing 
investigation,  argue for  his case.  To a  large extent, his language does not  constitute 
securitising  moves,  as he is not  attempting  a  coercion  of the audience - he is merely 
delivering  his account of the process as demanded by  the Security  Council. This is 
not saying  that  he does not use security  language in  terms of arguing for  the 
wrongdoings of the GoS, but merely  to say  that  he does not  speak  to influence the 
politicians in terms of adopting new measures.
The shift in  the discussions and language within  the Security  Council  from  a focus on 
the gravity  of the situation  and measures to implement  to an  immense focus on  the 
political process and an  urging  of peace negotiations is the most  important 
development in terms of securitisation.  The turn to a  heavy  focus on  political 
developments is not  only  within political representatives within  the Security  Council, 
but as can be seen  from  the above,  is highly  proposed and argued for  by  UN officials 
alike. Following  this development, the UNAMID mission is turned into something 
that  will  only  work when there is a  peace agreement  on the ground. It  furthermore 
contributes to the discussion  of the indictment  of Bashir  - will it impede or  further 
the political development  if Bashir  is prosecuted,  or  should it  be deferred as to keep 
the focus on first and foremost  establishing  peace? So this development,  to some 
extent, turns the table, in  terms of the argumentation  which  is used and what  the 
objective is. This development can  be seen  as moving the issue further  into the realm 
of normal  politics,  decreasing,  if not  the urgency,  then  the extraordinariness of the 
measures that  should be implemented. Conclusively, we are not  able  to define any 
successful  securitisation  during  the course of 2008.  There simply,  has not  been  any 
attempts to securitise the conflict or to take further measures. 
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26  The proponents of  deferring of  the indictments are  among others China, Russia, 
Libya, Burkina Faso and South Africa. Countries still  supporting the referral  counts US, 
France, Italy, UK, Croatia, Indonesia, Costa Rica. It is important  to note  that the AU’s 
Peace and Security  Council  has suggested to defer  it as well  - as South Africa mentions in 
the same meeting - because of  a focus on establishing political  peace as the primary 
objective.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS TO SECURITISATION ON 
UN LEVEL
In this chapter  we will  go through  the three most important  findings concerning the 
application  of the securitisation  framework  to UN level. First, we consider  a  stronger 
focus on actor  analysis,  as part the framework. Second, we discuss whether  a  division 
into phases of identification  and mobilisation  would benefit  a  securitisation  analysis 
on  UN level. Third, we discuss the importance of the bureaucracy  both  in the specific 
case of Darfur and in UN in general.
ACTOR AND SPEECH ACT 
Analysing the discourse within  the Security  Council from  2003  until  2009  has shown 
that  the UN Officials have played a  major  role in  the securitisations,  both  in  setting 
the discourse as well as determining  what measures to adopt.  An  increased emphasis 
on  understanding  the individual actors, we argue, could provide significant  insights 
when  applying  the securitisation framework to the UN Security  Council.  These 
insights could be obtained if implementing some of the emphasis Didier  Bigo27 puts 
on  analysing  the actors of securitisation. Buzan, Wæver  & de Wilde argue that  “...  no 
one exclusively  ‘holds’ the power  of securitisation 28”  why  “...  the  practice of 
securitisation is the center  of analysis.”  (1998: 31-32). Bigo disagrees arguing  that  “In 
this respect,  it  is impossible to evaluate the meaning  of threats by  judging exclusively 
on  the manifest  basis of statements themselves.  It must  be qualified by  paying 
attention  to who is in  the position of enunciation  and the positions of authority  of the 
enunciators themselves,  keeping  in  mind their  personal,  political and institutional 
interests within the field.” (Bigo 2007: 394). 
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27 Didier  Bigo is connected to the  Paris School  of  Security  Studies, that  focus on  political 
sociology to gain an increased understanding of the bureaucracy and actors. 
28 Still  noting that  social  capital  is of major  importance. In  a footnote they  explain  how 
they  adopt the works of  Pierre  Bourdieu and his concept  of  the  ‘performative  force’ of the 
speech act  - it  makes what it  says. What is important to note here is that  the  emphasis on 
the ‘performative force’ means that the  social  capital  is given  by  the speech (not  the 
actor), as the ‘social  magic’ as Judith Butler  calls it, gives the speech act authority  in itself 
and not because  of  the actor. The authority  that  is required to perform a successful 
securitisation  is thus given by  the organisational  logic of  the speech act more than by  the 
social capital of the actor - according to Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde (1998: 46-47). 
In  our  analysis we find that  it  could be beneficial  to pay  more attention  to the actor, 
not opposed to,  but  in  combination  with  the organisational  logic of the speech  act  - 
especially  when  it  comes to the UN Officials.  We identified a  strong  shift in  the 
discourse from  a  focus on  military,  interventionist and sanctioning  measures to a 
strong focus on  furthering  a  political solution and peace negotiations,  at the same 
time as Jan Pronk was substituted by  Jan Eliasson.  Jan  Pronk was in  fact  thrown  out 
of the Sudan  by  the GoS,  and Jan  Eliasson  seemingly  took  over  his responsibilities to 
the Security  Council.  Their  respective  speeches showcase this shift,  and a  further 
analysis of their  background and professional opinions on  conflict resolution  would 
be needed to strengthen  an  understanding  of their  role. Using  the approach  provided 
by  Bigo,  and his focus on  the the actor  combined together  with  the CS’s emphasis on 
the speech  act  might provide a  better  understanding  of the UN Security  Council’s 
decisions.  It  should be emphasised that  our  analysis only  shows indications in  this 
direction and should because of that  not be thought  of as more than  a consideration. 
An analysis taking  on the task of testing  the implementation of Bigo’s actor  focus in 
the securitisation framework would be needed. 
PHASES OF IDENTIFICATION AND MOBILISATION
Another  point  of critique to the securitisation  framework  have been  articulated by 
Paul  Roe (2008) who argues that dividing  the securitisation  analysis into a  stage of 
identification  and a  stage of mobilisation  provides a better understanding  of the 
evolution from speech act to measure. 
Roe’s theoretical argument  is that there is a  significant  difference between  the 
intersubjective understanding of a  security  threat  and that of the mobilisation to 
alleviate the threat. His argument  takes its point  of departure in  the UK’s decision to 
invade Iraq alongside the US, and thus, his analysis has a  different structure.  The 
stage of identification  (or  rhetorical securitisation) is separate from  the phase of 
mobilisation  (active securitisation)  and it  is therefore not necessarily  followed by  the 
other.  This critique of the CS’ framework is based on  a  basic disagreement of when a 
securitisation is successful. In  the CS framework, the success of a  securitisation  is 
dependent  on  whether  or  not  emergency  measures are legitimised through  the 
acceptance of the securitising actors speech  act. If the audience has been  coerced and 
accepts the referent object  as existentially  threatened, adopting  the possibility  of 
emergency  measures and a  move from  normal to panic politics,  then  it is successful. 
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Roe argues that  while an audience might accept the moral argument  of something  as 
a  security  threat, the intersubjective understanding  of what to do might  not  be 
reached. Although  our analysis is done in  a  different  setting, Roe’s argument  can  still 
contribute to some important  insights. It is through  our analysis clear  that there is an 
intersubjective understanding  of the humanitarian crisis in  Darfur  as grave.  The 
same cannot  be  said reaching  agreements in  the phase of mobilisation  - when 
sanctions and resolutions are discussed.
While  we agree with Roe that  there is a  clear  distinction between  the intersubjective 
agreements within  identification  and mobilisation,  we would not go so far as to say 
(at  least  in  the UN Security  Council) that  they  are clearly  separate in the same way  as 
in  his original critique. In our  analysis the identification and mobilisation phases 
cannot be divided in  the same way.  In  both  Roe’s and Kírálys analysis they  are able to 
identify  the phases in  different fora  - enabling  them  to analyse the shift in  discourse 
from  one forum  to another,  in  their  case a  move from  the wider  public  to that  of 
government.  Using  Roe’s phases, within  one forum, have forced us to look at whether 
the different  phases are apparent  in  the discourses of individual actors. What  we 
found through  the analysis is a  somewhat clear  division  between  a  broad 
intersubjective understanding of the threat in the Security  Council, but  a vivid 
disagreement when  it  comes to the understanding  of which  measures to implement. 
Thus, we are able to, with  the help of Roe’s phases,  to identify  that  taking  action  in 
the Security  Council is not difficult  because Darfur  is not  identified as a  threat  to 
international peace and security  but  more likely  because of disagreements within  the 
phase of mobilisation.  Furthermore it  can  also be argued that  Roe’s supplement to 
securitisation through  a  division  into phases also works as an  analytical tool within 
one forum and not only when securitisations are transferred from one to another. 
One could argue that  the division  into phases is indifferent  to the results of a 
securitisation analysis as the original  framework is exclusively  focused on  defining 
when, why  and how  certain threats become existential and thereby  legitimises 
emergency  measures.  The focus on  legitimising  emergency  measures is important  for 
the CS as they  “...  abstain from  attempts to talk about  what  “real security”  would be 
for  people,  what  are “actual”  security  problems …”  (Buzan,  Wæver  & de Wilde 1998: 
35).  That  focus limits the securitisation  to not  “be  spread over  ever  more 
sectors” (Ibid. 35).  
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However,  we find that  this division  enables the analyst,  during the course of the 
investigation,  to define in  which  phase (dis)agreements might  be present  - also in 
issues not  reaching emergency  measures.  Consequently  the division  might  not bring 
any  further significant  findings to ‘clear-cut’ cases of securitisation,  but in cases as 
the Darfur  conflict,  which is very  complex in  every  sense,  it  enables the analyst to go 
into depth with  different important  aspects of the securitisation. More analyses of 
this kind might show a pattern or show that this was a single case. 
Another  important  aspect  of Roe’s approach  is that  our  analysis shows a 
disagreement in  the mobilisation  phase between  e.g. US and China,  enabling  us to 
look into causes of this disagreement  with  a heavy  focus on  policies,  material 
interests and ideological  implications on the question of intervention.  Taking  this 
distinction  between identification  and mobilisation  phases into account  thus enables 
the analyst to use more traditional analytical tools in  order  to understand the 
(dis)agreements,  still  using  the securitisation  framework  as an  overall guide for  the 
investigation.  The basic  aim  of the securitisation is “to gain  an  increasingly  precise 
understanding  of who securitizes, on what  issues (threats), for  whom  (referent 
objects), why, with  what results,  and not least,  under  what conditions (i.e.,  what 
explains when securitisation  is successful).”  (Buzan,  Wæver  and de Wilde 1998: 32). 
If this is the case, then the divisional approach  helps to clarify  and investigate what 
conditions are underlying  for securitisations that  are not successful,  which  might 
even  be more important  than determining  only  when they  are successful.  Thus the 
division  of phases does not  constitute yet another  widening  of the security  concept 
but an  analytical tool that  enables the analyst to investigate cases in  which 
securitisation has not  been  ‘successful’ and opens for  an  investigation of causes for 
this ‘failure’.
BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINTS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Through  our  analysis we found that  there was a  stronger  connection  between  the 
discourse of the UN Officials and the action  taken  than  that  between  the state 
officials and action  taken.  Trying  to understand this phenomenon  we draw  on 
Weber’s classic theories of the bureaucracy. Weber was worried that  the strict rules, 
rational action and pursuits of efficiency  through instrumental calculations would 
result  in  undermining  humanitarian  goals (Bilton et al.  2002: 485).  Weber  termed 
this phenomenon the “Iron Cage”. The same logic is also to a  large degree prevalent 
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in  the works of Bigo, who relates it  to the sector  of security  saying: “The possibility  of 
autonomy  for  the security  sector, as compared to the recognised autonomy  of the 
banking sector, is not often evoked.” (Bigo 2007: 396). 
This rationalisation  of the political is present  in  our  analysis as well.  It  can  be argued 
that  the strong  focus on  determining  whether  the crisis constitutes genocide or  not 
could be termed instrumental calculation, as Weber  calls it.  Calculating on  whether 
the crisis can  be labelled genocide or  not, while thousands are  being  killed,  we thus 
consider  a  rejection  of humanitarian  values.  Furthermore it  indicates that rational 
action have undermined the political which  is suddenly  constrained by  the “Iron 
Cage”  of bureaucracy.  It  is especially  prominent  in  the case of the UN that  builds on 
the rationalisation  of conflict  management.  The sanctions imposed and resolutions 
adopted builds on  strategies that  have been  developed through  time inside the UN, 
as a  rational  way  of organising  what  constitutes threats and what  should be done to 
alleviate them. 
As a  consequence of this, it  seems that  the bureaucratic institution  of UN is also very 
important in determining  when conflicts are grave enough  to require sanctions,  what 
these sanctions shall include. Thereby  the bureaucracy  obtains a  great deal  of 
autonomy  through  its responsibility  to classify  conflicts,  gather  information, advise 
politicians etc..  Our  empirical findings point in  this direction  as there is a  clear 
discrepancy  between  UN officials and the political state representatives in  terms of 
applying R2P language.  After  the adoption  of the norm  through Resolution 1674  the 
state representatives adopt  the strong  language of the norm  right  away,  and start 
using it for legal arguments as earlier mentioned. 
However,  the bureaucracy; the UN officials,  does not  incorporate  this language in 
their  speeches until  a year  later.  This indicates that even  though  the state 
representatives change their  language when addressing  the conflict, the measures 
taken  are still a product  of the existing  rules within  UN - not  a  product  of the 
emerging  norm  of Responsibility  to Protect.  The fact  that the bureaucracy  does not 
use R2P language could be connected to the fact  that  the norm  opposes the existing 
paradigm  of sovereignty.  Consequently  the R2P norm  cannot be naturally  adopted as 
it  conflicts with  existing rules and is furthermore not  widely  accepted why  the 
bureaucracy does not act on it. 
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This argument  builds on the constructivist  argument made by  Barnett and 
Finnemore (1999) on  the power  of international organisations (IO).  They  argue that 
the IO becomes “autonomous sites of authority,  independent  from  the state 
“principals”  who may  have created them, because of power  flowing  from  at  least  two 
sources: (1)  the legitimacy  of the rational-legal  authority  they  embody, and (2) 
control  over  technical expertise and information.”  (ibid.: 707). Our  analysis 
showcases elements of both  parts of this argument. As described above,  rational-
legal  authority  of the UN bureaucracy  is what forms the outcome of discussions. 
What  sanctions are decided on  are based on  historically  developed procedures within 
the Security  Council29. The second source of autonomy  is based on a  notion that  the 
bureaucracy  embodies values and goals itself,  building  on the first source of 
autonomy. These values,  argues Barnett  and Finnemore (ibid.: 709), again  building 
on  Weber, are vested in  the bureaucracy, as it  is created to “serve some social 
purpose or  set  of cultural values”  (ibid.) as ‘good’ or  ‘bad’ as they  might  be.  Even 
though  this view  of the bureaucracy  might not  seem  negative, the  very  essence of the 
bureaucracy,  dominated by  rational  action  and instrumental calculations,  risks 
undermining  the very  same values. Following  that  argument,  it  could be part  of an 
explanation  why  it  was so hard to decide on  action  that  could protect the people of 
Darfur. 
In  our  analysis,  the second source of autonomy  - knowledge and expertise - can  be 
seen as UN officials are responsible for  gathering  information about  the conflict  and 
delivering  policy  recommendations to the Security  Council.  In  that regard the 
bureaucracy exercises power in its control of information and knowledge. 
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29 These universal  rules of  how  to act, Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 721) argues, can 
serve both as increasing and decreasing efficiency. Increasing, since the bureaucracy 
accumulate technical  and organisational  expertise  which can be transferred across 
conflicts. Decreasing, since the ‘flattening’ of  diversity  in cultures across the  world, and 
the transfer  of  certain knowledge from one conflict  to another  can  have negative 
consequences, because of a lack of assessing the new conflict and its own specific causes.
CONCLUSIONS
The Copenhagen  School challenges traditional approaches to security  studies 
allowing  for  analytical focus on  speech  acts and the importance of the social 
construction  of threats.  Furthermore the securitisation framework allows, through  a 
widening of the concept of security  to focus on different  sectors and aspects of 
security. 
Through  the securitisation  analysis of the UN Security  Council’s meetings on Darfur, 
from  2003  to 2009, we have found that  it  is indeed a  valuable analytical framework. 
Through  the course of our  investigation  we have made the following  empirical 
findings concerning the Security Council’s handling of the conflict in Darfur.
Despite a  broad agreement of the gravity  and seriousness of the Darfur  conflict  in  the 
Security  Council, there were wide disagreements on  what measures should be taken 
to alleviate the conflict.  While  countries such as the US,  France and UK, through 
securitising  moves, tried to legitimise such  grave measures as intervention,  other 
countries such  as China  and Russia  were focused on  peace negotiations and political 
mediation  through the Security  Council. These basic disagreements, manifested in 
resolutions that were not unanimously  adopted,  could be considered weak and were 
characterised by  a  lack of will from  the Government of the the Sudan to abide by  the 
resolutions agreed on  in  the Security  Council.  In  an  unofficial statement,  from  2006, 
a senior Sudanese Government Official is cited saying:
“The  United Nations Security Council has  threatened us so many times, we 
no longer take it seriously.” 
(cited in Nathan 2007: 249).
Even  though  sanctions were imposed on  several occasions,  the case was referred to 
the ICC and a  resolution,  extending  the UNMIS mandate to Darfur,  was adopted, it 
did not stop the Government of Sudan  from  arming  Janjaweed and perpetrating 
human  rights violations against  its own  population.  What was characteristic  about 
the resolutions adopted was the fact that  they  all invited the consent  of the Sudanese 
Government - respecting its full sovereignty. It  also became evident  that  the votes 
from  especially  China  and Russia  served as facilitating conditions,  thus determining 
whether the resolutions would prove valuable or not. 
SIB 21.2 Group 9A, 2nd semester spring 2012
53 of 59
The strong emphasis on  respect  for  the sovereignty  of Sudan  implies that  the 
emerging  norm  of Responsibility  to Protect  was not as strong  as one could have 
thought when  it  was adopted in  2005. Our analysis did however show  that  the 
Responsibility  to Protect  norm  was effectively  adopted within  the rhetorics of the 
state representatives when  describing  the conflict.  However, the measures adopted 
did not follow  the strong  discourse present when  identifying  the conflict. This 
underlines the argument of Paul  Roe,  that  the securitisation framework  can  be 
further  strengthened by  a distinction  between the phase of identifying  a threat  and a 
mobilisation  phase in  which measures are agreed on.  We,  however, find that the 
division  is not necessarily  to be found only  between  different fora,  but it is also 
applicable in  a  single  forum, such  as the Security  Council,  and in this case it is a 
rhetorical division. Using Roe’s phases, we also found that  the mobilisation phase 
could hardly  be explained through  the securitisation  framework alone.  As Kírály 
argue this makes for  the possibility  of combining  other  theoretical frameworks with 
securitisation to understand the different phases in depth.
Investigating  whether  the Responsibility  to Protect had become institutionalised and 
thereby  legitimising  sovereignty  violating  actions such  as intervention, we found that 
the UN Officials had not  adopted the language nor  the measures catered for  in 
resolution  1674. Despite the fact that the state representatives in  2006  extensively 
adopted the rhetorics of Responsibility  to Protect  the UN Officials did not. 
Furthermore the state representatives repeatedly  identified the GoS as an  existential 
threat  to the the referent object (the people of Darfur)  without  moving  it  from 
normal politics. The measures taken  were thus more closely  connected to the 
discourse of the UN Officials than  that of the state representatives. Not only  did 
measures taken follow  the discourse of the UN Officials,  the action  taken  could also 
be considered part of the “normal”  UN measures existing within the paradigm  of 
sovereignty.  That  explains why  some actions, even  highly  revolutionary  decisions 
such  as the referral to the ICC and the creation  of UNAMID, did not challenge the 
paradigm  of sovereignty.  On  that  grounding  we conclude that the Responsibility  to 
Protect norm  is not  accepted within  the UN bureaucracy  since it does not define the 
adopted resolutions nor  the UN Official’s discourse. It  furthermore showed us that 
the critique to securitisation given  by  Didier  Bigo,  emphasising  on  analysing the 
actor  before the speech  act,  is important  to note.  These findings strengthens 
constructivist theory  of IR,  specifically  those of Barnett and Finnemore (1999), 
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emphasising  the importance of understanding  bureaucratic  autonomy  in 
international organisations. 
These conclusions leads us to the following recommendations for  a  stronger 
securitisation analysis on UN level:
1.  The analyst  should take on a  stronger  analytical  emphasis on a  distinction  between 
the phases of identification and mobilisation.  This enables the analyst  to make a 
more precise analysis and invites him  to use other  theoretical frameworks in  order to 
understand the different  phases - without  undermining the valuable analytical 
findings the securitisation framework offers.
2. When analysing  securitisations within  the UN one must  consider  the importance 
of the bureaucracy  as an actor, and thus an  adoption  of constructivist  IR theory  on 
bureaucratic autonomy  is necessary. This should not remove analytical  focus from 
the speech  act but serve as a  complementary  tool for  understanding the connection 
between actor and speech act. 
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